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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Gordon Thomas Levitt 
 
Master of Science 
 
Conflict and Dispute Resolution Program 
 
June 2016 
 
Title: Changing Climate, Changing Commitments: Municipal Greenhouse Gas Reduction 
Strategies in Oregon 
 
This thesis examines emerging commitments by local governments in Oregon to 
address climate change, and situates those efforts within climate policy development at 
the international, national, regional, and state governmental levels. It also reviews the 
literature for local climate initiatives and seeks to expand upon that knowledge by 
surveying “Climate Policymakers” in Oregon. The survey results provide insight into the 
challenges and opportunities associated with local government and state-level efforts to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Oregon. Considering current climate policies, a 
broad selection of scholarly analysis, and the opinions of leading climate policy experts 
in Oregon, this thesis recommends eight categories of strategies to enhance greenhouse 
gas reduction efforts in Oregon. 
 v 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
NAME OF AUTHOR:  Gordon Thomas Levitt 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
 University of Oregon, Eugene 
  
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
 
 Master of Science, Conflict and Dispute Resolution, 2016, University of Oregon 
 Juris Doctor, 2016, University of Oregon 
 Bachelor of Arts, Robert D. Clark Honors College, Political Science, 2012, 
University of Oregon  
  
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
 
 Environmental, Natural Resources, and Land Use Law and Policy 
 Environmental Conflict Resolution 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
 
Policy Fellow, Oregon Governor’s Natural Resources Office, January 2015 – June 
2015 
 
 Research Assistant, University of Oregon School of Law, August 2013 – May 
2015 
 
 Policy Researcher, PolicyInteractive, May 2014 – December 2014 
 
 Law Clerk, Our Children’s Trust, May 2013 – September 2014 
 
 
 vi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I wish to express sincere appreciation to Professor Mary Christina Wood and 
Margi Hoffmann for their assistance with this project. Their dedication to creative 
climate change solutions is inspiring and this project would not have been possible 
without their thoughtful guidance. In addition, special thanks are due to Tom Bowerman, 
Adam Davis, and Robin Quirke for their contributions to the design of this project’s 
survey. Many friends and colleagues also were helpful as questions arose during the 
project. They include Kata Bahnsen-Reinhardt, Anna Shamble, Jess Yates, Julia Olson, 
Elizabeth Brown, Nate Bellinger, Professor Jared Margolis, Matt McRae, Doug Quirke, 
Rebecca Flynn, Heather Brinton, Professor Todd Jarvis, Tim Hicks, Professor Barbara 
Tint, Jennifer Gleason, Wes Knoll, Rory Isbell, Alexis Biddle, Tori Wilder, and Anne 
Haugaard. Finally, my fiancé Malia Losordo, my mother Margi Bolstad, my father Gregg 
Levitt, my step-mother Pat Levitt, and my sister Maddie Belknap provided crucial 
support throughout the research and writing process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
 
 
I. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  ..................................................................................... 1 
II. INTRODUCTION  .................................................................................................. 3 
Scaling Down: Contextualizing Authority for Local Climate Action in  
Oregon.................................................................................................................... 4 
 
 International Emission Reduction Efforts ........................................................ 4 
 National Level Emission Reduction Efforts in the U.S.  ................................. 8 
 Regional Emission Reduction Efforts in the U.S.  ........................................... 12 
State of Oregon Emission Reduction Efforts ................................................... 14 
Local Emission Reduction Landscape in Oregon  ........................................... 17 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW  ..................................................................................... 21 
 Scholarly Discussion of Local Governments’ Authority to Address Climate 
Change and Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions  .................................................. 21 
 
 Local Government Climate Policy: Substantive or Symbolic? ....................... 21 
  Energy Efficiency ...................................................................................... 22 
  Transportation  ........................................................................................... 22 
  Community Planning and Design  ............................................................. 23 
  Solid Waste and Materials Management  .................................................. 24 
  Renewable Energy  .................................................................................... 24 
  Carbon Sequestration  ................................................................................ 25 
  Public Education and Outreach .................................................................. 25 
  Climate Change Adaptation  ...................................................................... 26 
  Local Climate Action Plans  ...................................................................... 27 
 viii 
Chapter Page 
  
 
 Local Government Engagement in Plural Climate Regulatory Structures 
Within the U.S. Federalist System  .................................................................. 30 
 
 The Future of Local Government Climate Actions in Oregon  ....................... 34 
  Energy Efficiency ...................................................................................... 34 
  Transportation  ........................................................................................... 35 
  Community Planning and Design  ............................................................. 36 
  Solid Waste and Materials Management  .................................................. 38 
  Renewable Energy  .................................................................................... 38 
  Carbon Sequestration  ................................................................................ 39 
  Public Education and Outreach .................................................................. 39 
  Climate Change Adaptation  ...................................................................... 39 
  Local Climate Action Plans  ...................................................................... 40 
IV. METHODOLOGY  ............................................................................................... 41 
V. FINDINGS  ............................................................................................................. 44 
 Demographic Findings  .......................................................................................... 44 
 Substantive Findings  ............................................................................................. 48 
VI. DISCUSSION  ....................................................................................................... 65 
 Survey Respondent Demographics  ....................................................................... 65 
 GHG Emission Reduction Challenges  .................................................................. 66 
 Obstacles to City-Level GHG Emission Reductions  ...................................... 66 
 Trends in City-Level Obstacles to Reducing GHG Emissions  ....................... 68 
 GHG Emission Reduction Opportunities .............................................................. 69 
 ix 
Chapter Page 
  
 
 Emission Reduction Relationship Between the State of Oregon and  
Local Governments .......................................................................................... 69 
 
  Adopt Carbon Pricing ................................................................................ 70 
  Require Local Actions  .............................................................................. 70 
  Give Local Governments More Flexibility  ............................................... 70 
  Increase State Leadership and Coordination of Local Governments  ........ 70 
  Increase Funding for Local Governments ................................................. 71 
  Incentivize and Emphasize Economic Opportunities  ............................... 71 
 GHG Emission Reduction Ambitions and Intergovernmental Relations  ............. 71 
 Stronger GHG Regulations?  ........................................................................... 71 
 City GHG Emission Reduction Expectations?  ............................................... 72 
 Should Local Governments Wait for Larger Jurisdictions Before  
Developing New Emission Reduction Policies? ............................................. 73 
 
  Encouraging Larger Jurisdictions to Be More Ambitious ......................... 73 
  Local Governments Should Do Everything Feasible to Reduce  
Emissions .................................................................................................. 73 
 
  Local Government Initiatives Can Encourage Innovation ......................... 74 
 Mitigation, Adaptation, and Impacts on Low-Income and Vulnerable 
Populations .............................................................................................................  74 
 
 Effectiveness of GHG Emission Reduction Policy Mechanisms  ......................... 75 
 Limitations of Survey Results  ............................................................................... 79 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS  .................................................................................... 82 
 Revisit Past Studies  ............................................................................................... 83 
 Align the Climate Agenda With Other Local Priorities......................................... 84 
 x 
Chapter Page 
 
  
 Advocate for Funding  ........................................................................................... 87 
 Enhance Information Sharing and Transparency  .................................................. 94 
 Promote Collaboration  .......................................................................................... 97 
 Consider New Governance Bodies  ....................................................................... 99 
 Incorporate Social and Environmental Justice into Local Climate  
Initiatives .................................................................................................. 100 
 
 Apply Pressure to State and Federal Government  ................................................ 102 
VIII. CONCLUSION  .................................................................................................. 105 
REFERENCES CITED  ............................................................................................... 108 
  
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table Page 
 
 
1. Table 1: Summary of RPS Targets and Timelines................................................. 16 
 
2. How long have you worked on GHG Emission reduction efforts? ....................... 44 
 
3. Please identify which age bracket you belong to:  ................................................. 44 
4. Which political party do you identify with?  ......................................................... 45 
5. How would you describe your general political outlook?  .................................... 45 
6. What is the highest level of education you have completed?  ............................... 45 
7. What is your household income (all members combined)?  .................................. 46 
8. Where do you currently reside?  ............................................................................ 46 
9. Please note your ethnic background. ..................................................................... 47 
10. Which gender do you identify with? ...................................................................... 47 
11. Agreement strength: there should be stronger policies to reduce GHGs.  ............. 48 
12. How much should cities in Oregon reduce GHGs?  .............................................. 49 
13. Choice between policy actions to reduce GHGs or adapt to climate change?  ...... 50 
14. GHG policies and low-income/vulnerable communities  ...................................... 51 
15. Effectiveness of policy mechanisms at reducing GHGs ........................................ 52 
16. Obstacles to GHG reductions in Oregon’s cities  .................................................. 53 
17. Which sectors should Oregon focus on to limit GHG emissions? ........................ 54 
 
 
 1 
 
CHAPTER I 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis discusses the challenges and opportunities for local governments, 
primarily municipalities, in Oregon to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The 
project was inspired by the author’s personal involvement in all aspects of the Youth 
Climate Action Now (YouCAN) Eugene Campaign between May 2013 and August 2014. 
The YouCAN Campaign resulted in the adoption of the Climate Recovery Ordinance, 
which legally obligates the City of Eugene to achieve outcomes that substantially reduce 
GHG emissions.1 After this successful campaign, the author sought to develop GHG 
emission reduction recommendations for local governments across Oregon.  
A changing climate merits an effort by Oregon’s local governments to change 
their climate commitments, but many governments do not have the resources to develop 
specific commitments or a general framework to guide those commitments. Thus, this 
thesis features recommendations for local governments based on the following research 
questions: 
 In relation to GHG emission reduction policies: how do actions by Oregon’s 
local governments relate to actions being pursued by international, national, 
regional, and state-level actors? This question is discussed in the Introduction. 
 Based on relevant literature, how do scholars perceive local government 
climate initiatives, and which policies have they proposed? This question is 
discussed in the Literature Review. 
 Within the sectors identified by scholars of local climate action, which types 
of GHG emission reduction policies are local governments in Oregon already 
pursuing? This question is discussed in the Literature Review. 
 According to Oregon’s “Climate Policymakers”2, what are the challenges and 
opportunities of local efforts to reduce GHG emissions? This question is 
discussed in the Findings and Discussion.   
                                                          
1 For more information on the Climate Recovery Ordinance, see pg. 36 infra. 
  
2 For a description of the “Climate Policymaker” population, see pg. 41 infra. 
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 Based on the literature review and the results of the survey of “Climate 
Policymakers” in Oregon, which GHG emission reduction policies should be 
considered by local governments? This question is discussed in the 
Recommendations. 
Finally, the thesis concludes with a discussion of how efforts to better understand and 
implement local climate policy in Oregon are essential for addressing a changing climate 
in Oregon.  
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CHAPTER II 
INTRODUCTION 
The best available climate science states that global emissions of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) and other GHGs must sharply decrease if humanity wishes to preserve a habitable 
climate system.3 While the causes and effects of climate change may be global in scale, 
responses to it should come from governmental and nongovernmental actors at all levels 
– international, national, regional, state, and local. Local government action matters 
because local communities are already on the frontlines of a changing climate and will be 
on the frontlines of a changing legal and policy framework. Regardless of whether the 
framework changes as a result of top-down, bottom-up, or some combination of these 
pressures, local governments will have a role to play, and Oregon’s local governments 
can lead the way.    
Oregon cities have a history of climate leadership. For example, Portland was the 
first city in the U.S. to adopt a local climate action plan. As of 2009, five local 
governments in Oregon had completed inventories of GHG emissions4, and 16 cities, 
including most of the states’ largest cities such as Portland, Eugene, Bend, Corvallis, 
Beaverton, and Gresham are currently signatories to the Mayor’s Climate Protection 
Agreement - a commitment to reduce emissions by 7% from 1990 levels by 2012.5 
Furthermore, this leadership has been more than symbolic; Portland has reduced carbon 
emissions 14% since 1990, despite the addition of 150,000 people to its metropolitan 
area.6 
                                                          
3 James Hansen, et. al.; Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions 
to Protect Young People, Future Generations and Nature; PLOS One (2013); 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0081648. 
  
4 Report to the Legislature 2009, Oregon Global Warming Commission, 
http://www.keeporegoncool.org/sites/default/files/ogwc-standard-documents/09CommissionReport.pdf, at 
15. 
 
5 List of Participating Mayors, Mayor’s Climate Protection Center, U.S. Conference of Mayors, 
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/list.asp, last accessed 1-16-16. 
 
6 Elizabeth Willmott, The Urban Clean Energy Revolution, Climate Solutions (November 2015), 
http://climatesolutions.org/sites/default/files/uploads/pdf/urban_clean_energy_revolution_web.pdf at 3.  
 
 4 
 
While successes like Portland’s are laudable, the fact remains that Oregon is not 
on pace to meet state-level GHG emission reduction goals, and one of the reasons is that 
local governments are not cumulatively contributing sufficient emission reductions. 
Nearly 10 years ago, Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski’s Climate Change Integration 
Group urged the state’s leadership to initiate a rapid transition to a low carbon economy 
and warned that “waiting to act is not a wise choice… [because] changes to the climate 
are significant, and will require all parts of civilization … to invest considerable thought 
and capital to successfully prepare and adapt.”7 The need for considerable investment in 
Oregon also was recognized: the Climate Change Integration Group’s report 
acknowledged that completing all of Oregon’s planned climate actions (as of 2009) 
would only yield about half of the reductions necessary to meet Oregon’s 2020 emission 
reduction goal.8  
Additional emission reduction efforts by Oregon’s municipalities can help bridge 
this gap. In order to understand the realm of possible GHG emission reduction actions by 
local governments (also referred to as cities, municipalities, and localities in this 
document)9, it is necessary to understand the types of climate initiatives currently being 
pursued by governmental and nongovernmental actors from the international to the local 
level.  
a. Scaling Down: Contextualizing Authority for Local Climate Action in 
Oregon 
i. International Emission Reduction Efforts 
International efforts to address climate change were formalized with the creation 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. 
Within five years of its creation, the UNFCCC endeavored to set specific emission 
                                                          
7 Final Report to the Governor: A Framework for Addressing Rapid Climate Change; The Governor’s 
Climate Change Integration Group (January 2008); 
http://www.oregon.gov/energy/gblwrm/docs/ccigreport08web.pdf at 4.  
 
8 Id. at 23. For more information on Oregon’s 2020 emission reduction goal, see pg. 15 infra.  
 
9 The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines municipalities as “a primarily urban political unit having 
corporate status and usually powers of self-government”; local governments as “the government of a 
specific local area constituting a subdivision of a major political unit…”; and cities as “a usually large or 
important municipality in the United States governed under a charter granted by the state.” See Merriam-
Webster, last accessed 2-22-16, http://www.merriam-webster.com/.  
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reduction targets, which led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The Kyoto 
Protocol was not broadly accepted, especially by political leadership in the United States, 
and only 38 countries remain committed to meeting their emission reduction goals by the 
end of the final commitment period in 2020.10 However, in December of 2015, 196 
nations signed the Paris Agreement to usher in the post-Kyoto international system for 
addressing climate change. 
For the purposes of this paper, the most important outcomes of the Paris 
Agreement are the commitment to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to 
well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature 
increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly 
reduce the risks and impacts of climate change….”11 The parties agreed that achieving 
this goal would necessitate “global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as 
possible…” and that subsequent emission reductions be guided by the “best available 
science” to equitably achieve global carbon neutrality from 2050 onward.12 According to 
the agreement, carbon neutrality means that anthropogenic emissions (not defined) are 
balanced by carbon sequestration uptakes. National mechanisms to achieve the goals of 
the agreement are referred to as Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) 
and the agreement specifies that such INDCs contain “domestic mitigation measures” 
that reflect a nation’s “highest possible ambition” in light of national capabilities and 
circumstances.13 For developed country Parties, ambitions should demonstrate continued 
leadership on “economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets.”14 Finally, the 
                                                          
10 The Bonn Climate Change Conference: Another Milestone on the Road to Paris; Climate Law Blog, 
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Columbia Law School (July, 2015); 
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2015/07/14/the-bonn-climate-change-conference-another-
milestone-on-the-road-to-paris/#sthash.P5xDXItz.dpuf. For detailed information on the Kyoto Protocol, see 
Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2014), 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. 
   
11 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(December, 2015), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf at 22. 
 
12Id. 
 
13Id. For more information on INDCs, see Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2014), 
http://unfccc.int/focus/indc_portal/items/8766.php.  
 
14 Adoption of the Paris Agreement at 22. 
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agreement recognized that current climate change adaptation needs already are significant 
and that increased climate change mitigation efforts now will reduce future adaptation 
needs and costs.15 
In addition to the Paris Agreement, a number of sub-national climate change 
agreements with international scope have emerged. Local governments are a crucial 
component of many of these agreements. For example, in July of 2015, a Climate Action 
Statement was signed by 22 state, provincial, and municipal governments at the Climate 
Summit of the Americas, including Oregon, Washington, and California.16 By signing 
this agreement, these governments have agreed to undertake one or more of the following 
actions: 
1. Set GHG emission reduction targets that contribute to limiting global temperature 
increases to 2 degrees Celsius; 
2. Join the Compact of States and Regions or Compact of Mayors;17 
3. Join the Under 2 MOU, which demonstrates parties’ commitment to pursue 
“emission reductions consistent with a trajectory of 80 to 95 percent below 1990 
levels by 2050 and/or achieving a per capita annual emission goal of less than 2 
metric tons by 2050”18; and  
4. Support carbon pricing, including the World Bank Carbon Pricing Leadership 
Coalition, and endorse the World Bank’s “Putting a Price on Carbon” statement.19 
                                                          
 
15 Id. at 25. 
 
16 See Climate Action Statement – Climate Summit of the Americas, Ontario Ministry of the Environment 
and Climate Change, http://news.ontario.ca/ene/en/2015/07/climate-action-statement---climate-summit-of-
the-americas.html, last accessed 8-4-15; for a list of Climate Action Statement Signatories, see also Let’s 
Stick Together: Why the Climate Summit of the Americas Matters, The Climate Reality Project (July 13, 
2015), https://www.climaterealityproject.org/blog/climate-summit. 
  
17 See Compact of States and Regions, The Climate Group, http://www.theclimategroup.org/what-we-
do/programs/compact-of-states-and-regions, last accessed 8-4-15; see also The Compact of Mayors, ICLEI: 
Local Governments for Sustainability, 
http://www.iclei.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ICLEI_WS/Documents/Climate/FINAL_MAYORS_COMPA
CT_TEXT_092214.pdf, last accessed 8-4-15.  
 
18 Global Climate Leadership Memorandum of Understanding, Under 2 MOU, http://under2mou.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Under-2-MOU-English.pdf at 1-2, last accessed 8-6-15. 
 
19 See Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, The World Bank, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/pricing-carbon#2, last accessed 8-4-15; see also Statement: Putting 
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The Compact of Mayors merits additional attention because it was supported by reputable 
local government organizations, including ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability, 
United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), and the C40 Climate Leadership Group. 
By joining this compact, participating local governments agreed “to undertake a 
transparent and supportive approach to reduce city-level emissions, to reduce 
vulnerability and to enhance resilience to climate change, in a consistent and 
complimentary manner to national level climate protection efforts.”20 This approach also 
emphasizes improved efficiency and ease of reporting for local officials and a 
commitment that such information will inform international processes and bodies tasked 
with addressing climate change. Finally, the compact seeks to compile local GHG 
reduction goals and to “quantify [the] impact of city commitments made to date.”21 Such 
compilation will likely be useful for future international climate negotiations because it 
will inform how much emphasis should be placed on emission reduction authority at each 
governance level based on demonstrated results.  
Another effort is Yale University’s Environmental Performance Index (EPI), 
which seeks to inform “data-driven environmental policymaking” in many sectors 
including climate and energy.22 According to the EPI, nearly 7,000 cities from 99 
countries (“representing approximately 11 percent of the global population and 32 
percent of the global GDP”) have joined an emission reduction platform or coalition.23 A 
recent report from Yale and other partners found that sub-national actors will have a 
prominent role in the success of the UNFCCC processes because they will be closer to 
                                                          
a Price on Carbon, The World Bank, 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Carbon-Pricing-Statement-060314.pdf, last 
accessed 8-6-15. 
20 The Compact of Mayors: Goals, Objectives and Commitments; C40 Cities, United Cities and Local 
Governments, Bonn Center for Local Climate Action and Reporting – carbonn Center and ICLEI – Local 
Governments for Sustainability (Sep. 2014); at 1. 
  
21 Id. at 2-4. 
  
22 Why Measurement Matters, Yale University Environmental Performance Index, http://epi.yale.edu/why-
measurement-matters, last accessed 1-14-16. 
  
23 New Report Demonstrates Local Actors’ Contribution to Global Climate Action, Yale University 
Environmental Performance Index, http://epi.yale.edu/the-metric/new-report-demonstrates-local-actors-
contribution-global-climate-action, last accessed 1-14-16.  
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the frontline implementation of the aforementioned mitigation goals, achievement of 
which will require unprecedented multi-level, scaled-up governmental cooperation.24 
Finally, the Climate Initiatives Platform and the Galvanizing the Groundswell of 
Climate Actions are two interesting efforts that may provide useful information to 
decision-makers at all governmental levels. The Climate Initiatives Platform was 
developed as “an attempt to collect, share, and track the burgeoning number of climate-
related commitments.”25 Similarly, Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions “is a 
series of open dialogues that aims to bring the groundswell of climate actions from cities, 
regions, companies, and other groups to a higher level of scale and ambition.”26 Given 
the herculean emission reduction challenges that lie ahead, such efforts to share and 
motivate additional climate action internationally are crucial. 
ii. National Level Emission Reduction Efforts in the U.S. 
The Obama Administration’s primary emission reduction efforts are anchored in 
rulemaking by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that uses the authority of 
Clean Air Act, Section 111(d) to regulate emissions from power plants. Note that the 
following discussion of 111(d) is heavily informed by Oregon regulators and 
policymakers’ opinions of how Oregon might comply with these new federal 
requirements, and does not extensively discuss the pending legal challenges to the EPA’s 
authority to implement the Clean Power Plan.27 Nonetheless, it is important to note that 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s stay of the Clean Power Plan means that the deadlines for 
states to submit compliance plans is indefinitely extended until legal challenges to the 
plan are resolved. Despite the stay, about one third of states, including Oregon, are 
                                                          
24 Angel Hsu, et. al.; Scaling Up: Local to Global Climate Action; R20 Regions of Climate Action (2015), 
http://regions20.org/images/ScalingUp.pdf at 79. 
 
25 Welcome, Climate Initiatives Platform, http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Welcome, last 
accessed 8-4-15.  
 
26 Galvanizing the Groundswell of Climate Actions, http://www.climategroundswell.org/, last accessed 1-
16-16. 
 
27 For more information on the legal challenges to the Clean Power Plan, see Inside the Most Important 
Supreme Court Case in Human History, Think Progress (Feb. 12, 2016), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2016/02/12/3748062/inside-the-most-important-supreme-court-case-in-
human-history/.  
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committed to moving forward with their compliance plans even though they are no 
longer required to do so.28 
In August of 2015, the EPA announced the final rule, known as the Clean Power 
Plan, which includes the “first-ever national standards that address carbon pollution from 
power plants.”29  This was a major step because “fossil fuel-fired power plants are by far 
the largest source of U.S. CO2 emissions, making up 31 percent of U.S. total greenhouse 
gas emissions.”30 By 2020, the Clean Power Plan aims to reduce “overall U.S. GHG 
emissions by 17% below 2005 levels….”31 By 2030, the U.S. EPA estimates that “carbon 
pollution from the power sector will be 32 percent below 2005 levels….”32 Based on 
these expectations, it is apparent that the Clean Power Plan’s emission reduction impact 
may taper off between 2020 and 2030, but perhaps other policies will be pursued during 
that time period if the initial stages of the Clean Power Plan are successful.  
In order to meet the EPA’s emission reduction goals, states “develop and 
implement plans that ensure that the power plants in their state – either individually, 
together or in combination with other measures – achieve the interim CO2 emissions 
performance rates over the period of 2022 to 2029 and the final CO2 emission 
performance rates, rate-based goals or mass-based goals, by 2030.”33 State plans will be 
developed based on EPA’s proposed emission reduction targets, which are informed by 
“the range and scale of supply (generation) and demand-side resources (the ‘Building 
                                                          
28 For a variety of statements from state leaders about the stay, see State Statements Following the Supreme 
Court's Decision to Stay the Clean Power Plan, Georgetown Climate Center (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/state-statements-following-the-supreme-courts-decision-to-stay-the-
clean-power-plan.  
 
29 Overview of the Clean Power Plan: Cutting Carbon Pollution from Power Plants; United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (Aug. 2015), http://www.epa.gov/airquality/cpp/fs-cpp-overview.pdf at 
1. 
 
30 Id. at 2. 
 
31 Angus Duncan, Clean Air Act Section 111(d) Co2 Reduction Compliance Pathways for the Pacific 
Northwest and Intermountain West States, 30 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 303, 305 (2015). 
 
32 Overview of the Clean Power Plan: Cutting Carbon Pollution from Power Plants at 2. 
 
33 Id. at 4. 
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Blocks’) available to that state….”34 States have discretion to devise a strategy that will 
achieve EPA’s proposed emission reductions.35 For example, the EPA has said that 
efforts to promote lower carbon energy supply, as well as demand side investments such 
as energy efficiency, will count toward a state’s compliance requirements so long as the 
efforts “displace real emissions.”36 
The proposed emission reductions for each state are based on regional CO2 
emission performance rates for coal and natural gas plants, and represent the EPA’s 
determination of the Best System of Emission Reductions (BSER); BSER is then applied 
to all affected sources in the state to produce the rate-based and mass-based emission 
reduction options for each state.37 Generally speaking, rate-based compliance is 
accomplished by achieving a reduction in emission rates that falls “somewhere between 
the national emission rate limits for coal plants and gas plants.”38 Mass-based reductions 
require decreases in the overall tonnage of pollution emitted and are calculated by 
multiplying a state’s emission rate limit by the projected electricity production in that 
state.39 
Regardless of the compliance path chosen, each state was previously required to 
either submit a final plan or a preliminary plan with a request for an extension (no later 
than September 2018) by September 6, 2016.40 The final Clean Power Plan only allowed 
an exception to these deadlines when at least two states work together to jointly submit a 
plan to meet their combined emission reduction responsibilities, resulting in a one-year 
                                                          
34 Clean Air Act Section 111(d) Co2 Reduction Compliance Pathways for the Pacific Northwest and 
Intermountain West States at 322. 
 
35 Id.  
 
36 Id. (citing Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 64,543, 64,546-47 (Section II.B.1. Stringency of Building Block 2) 
(proposed Oct. 30, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-10-30/pdf/2014-25845.pdf.).  
 
37 Overview of the Clean Power Plan: Cutting Carbon Pollution from Power Plants at 5. 
 
38 David Doniger; Understanding the EPA’s Clean Power Plan; Switchboard: Natural Resources Defense 
Council (August 2015); http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ddoniger/understanding_the_epas_clean_p.html.  
 
39 Id. 
 
40 Overview of the Clean Power Plan: Cutting Carbon Pollution from Power Plants at 8. 
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extension of the deadline.41 Again, given the Supreme Court’s stay of the Clean Power 
Plan, it is unclear when the new deadlines will be. 
While there are many reasons that states might not cooperate with one another in 
devising their individual plans or producing a multi-state plan, multi-state or regional 
plans could be desirable if they allow for emissions reductions to be “achieved at least 
cost and with [the] fewest required operational adjustments in the regional electricity 
system.”42 According to Angus Duncan, Chair of the Oregon Global Warming 
Commission, states with more aggressive emission reduction goals than those set by the 
EPA could benefit from regional compliance mechanisms because it could allow those 
states a least cost trajectory to help achieve state goals.43 Oregon is such a state – a fact 
that will become apparent when Oregon’s GHG reduction goals are discussed later. 
Given that Oregon has few stationary sources that will be affected by the Clean 
Power Plan, Oregon’s strategy will be a “system-based” approach “that evaluates a 
broader portfolio of measures including those that could be taken beyond the affected 
sources but still reduce emissions at the source.”44 Duncan believes that this approach, in 
conjunction with other states in the Western U.S., “might permit a multi-state emissions 
management structure like an Independent System Operator (ISO), or like a Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), to aggregate and average emissions across multiple 
plants owned by multiple operators.”45 An ISO, also known as a regional transmission 
organization (RTO), is an independent third party that dispatches different sources of 
power, minimizing the conflicts of interest that can occur when an entity owns the 
transmission and distribution system, but does not provide all of the power generation.46 
RGGI is described in the following section.  
                                                          
41 Id. at 6.  
 
42 Clean Air Act Section 111(d) CO2 Reduction Compliance Pathways for the Pacific Northwest and 
Intermountain West States at 305. 
 
43 Id. at 309. 
 
44 Id. at 315. 
 
45 Id. at 317. 
 
46 What are RTOs and Organized Markets? Electric Power Supply Association, 
https://www.epsa.org/industry/primer/?fa=rto, last accessed 1-26-16. 
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Duncan notes that a multi-state agreement would require “a state-to-state 
agreement covering emissions, power plants, and customer loads among the participating 
states… The participating states could then use an allocation agreement or allowance 
system to assign reduction responsibilities among themselves, as RGGI has done. For 
compliance, reduction would be totaled and reported as a single sum to EPA.”47 
However, Duncan notes that “A region-wide, multi-state pact like a RGGI is unlikely 
given the limited time for developing state compliance submissions to EPA, and the 
highly divergent views among the PNW [Pacific Northwest] and IMW [Inter-Mountain 
West] states on the threshold question whether GHG reductions are even necessary.”48 
Furthermore, despite the availability of a one-year extension for multi-state compliance 
plans, Duncan thinks it is unlikely these plans will emerge.  Many states’ responsiveness 
during the initial commenting period for the draft Clean Power Plan was sluggish and it is 
unlikely that states will be willing “to enter into the complex state-to-state and utility-to-
utility negotiations required while they are simultaneously developing a primary or 
fallback state-specific compliance strategy.”49 Nonetheless, one of the silver linings of 
the Supreme Court’s stay of the Clean Power Plan may be that states now have a longer 
timeframe to negotiate multi-state compliance agreements. Such agreements may be 
easier to scale up or integrate into a truly national system of emission reductions, perhaps 
following the U.S.’s next submittal of nationally-determined contributions to the 
international community.   
iii. Regional Emission Reduction Efforts in the U.S. 
Apart from any multi-state compliance mechanisms that might emerge under the 
Clean Power Plan, there are a number of regional emission reduction frameworks 
currently in place, as well as several now defunct efforts. The emergence of regional 
efforts may be a result of the growing number of states with GHG emission targets; as of 
                                                          
47 Clean Air Act Section 111(d) CO2 Reduction Compliance Pathways for the Pacific Northwest and 
Intermountain West States at 323. 
  
48 Id. at 319. 
 
49 Id. at 327. 
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August 2015, 20 states and the District of Columbia had greenhouse gas emission 
targets.50  
The most functional regional mechanism is the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI), which aims to cap and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector in 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont. RGGI has successfully reduced emissions from the power 
sector by at least 40% since 2005, while simultaneously encouraging economic growth.51 
Other regional efforts, however, have been less successful. For example, the 
Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord collapsed after federal cap and trade 
legislation failed in 2011. The accord likely collapsed because it was a platform primarily 
built in anticipation of comprehensive federal legislation. A similar, though less severe, 
step backwards occurred with the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), which was 
comprised of five states in the Western U.S. in 2007, grew to seven U.S. states and four 
Canadian provinces by 2010, and has now shrunk to California and the four original 
Canadian provinces.52 The WCI aims to “reduce regional GHG emissions to 15 percent 
below 2005 levels by 2020”, and to promote a green economy.53 Most of the West Coast 
jurisdictions, including Oregon, are now a part of the Pacific Coast Collaborative (PCC) 
and the non-binding Pacific Coast Action Plan on Climate and Energy, which aims to 
coordinate each jurisdiction’s longer term climate planning and other policies.54 Both the 
WCI and the PCC, however, appear to have been less successful than RGGI in reducing 
GHG emissions. Neither agreement requires emission reductions, so any reductions that 
                                                          
50 Greenhouse Gas Emission Targets, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, http://www.c2es.org/us-
states-regions/policy-maps/emissions-targets, last accessed 8-3-15.  
 
51 See How to Cut Carbon and Save Money: RGGI Delivers Yet Again; Union of Concerned Scientists 
(April 22, 2015); http://blog.ucsusa.org/rachel-cleetus/cut-carbon-and-save-money-rggi-delivers-yet-again-
713?. 
 
52 See History, Western Climate Initiative (2013), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/history; see also 
Program Design, Western Climate Initiative, Inc. (2014), http://www.wci-inc.org/program-design.php. 
   
53 Program Design, Western Climate Initiative (2013), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/designing-
the-program.  
 
54 Pacific Coast Action Plan on Climate and Energy, Pacific Coast Collaborative (October, 2013), 
http://www.pacificcoastcollaborative.org/Documents/Pacific%20Coast%20Climate%20Action%20Plan.pdf
.  
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have occurred in our region cannot be tied with any certainty to the WCI or the PCC 
frameworks. Instead, it appears that California’s initially unilateral action to develop an 
economy wide cap and trade system, now having been joined by Quebec and with several 
other Canadian provinces, is driving emission reductions in the western U.S. 
iv. State of Oregon Emission Reduction Efforts 
While the previous discussion of Oregon’s compliance with 111(d) covered the 
federal requirements that Oregon will need to meet, Oregon already has a number of 
other important legal requirements and goals related to emission reductions.  
In 1992, Oregon adopted a state benchmark to hold the state’s CO2 emissions at 
1990 levels.55 While this goal was not met and 1990 emission levels were exceeded, the 
state continued to develop new policy. In 1997, Oregon became the first state in the U.S. 
to regulate GHG emissions from energy facilities emitting carbon dioxide, regulations 
that were updated in 2003 to require that such facilities “reduce their net carbon dioxide 
emissions 17 percent below the most efficient baseload gas plant in the United States.”56 
The bill, HB 3283, set forth two alternate compliance mechanisms for affected utilities: 
1) directly implement CO2 offset projects or have a third party do so; and 2) provide 
funds to The Climate Trust, a nonprofit organization established by the bill, to develop 
projects that reduce or sequester CO2 emissions.
57 HB 3283 was updated with the passage 
of SB 101 in 2009, which expanded the emission reduction requirements to cover coal 
power plants and discontinued utility compliance through carbon offset purchases.58  
                                                          
55 Report to the Legislature 2009, Oregon Global Warming Commission, 
http://www.keeporegoncool.org/sites/default/files/ogwc-standard-documents/09CommissionReport.pdf, at 
9. 
 
56 State Power Plant Rules of Oregon, Washington, and Massachusetts; Stockholm Environment 
Institute and Greenhouse Gas Management Institute (2011); 
http://www.co2offsetresearch.org/policy/PowerPlantRules.html. 
  
57 Standards and Caps for Electricity GHG Emissions, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 
http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/policy-maps/electricity-emissions-caps, last accessed 8-3-15. 
 
58 Id.  
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 SB 101 may have passed in 2009 as a result of the passage of HB 3543 two years 
earlier in 2007. HB 3543 is a state declaration of policy that adopts greenhouse gas 
emission reduction targets for Oregon for 2010, 2020, and 2050. These goals are: 
(a) By 2010, arrest the growth of Oregon's greenhouse gas emissions and begin to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
(b) By 2020, achieve greenhouse gas levels that are 10 percent below 1990 levels. 
(c) By 2050, achieve greenhouse gas levels that are at least 75 percent below 1990 
levels.59 
In 2007, the Oregon Legislature also passed SB 838, which established a Renewable 
Portfolio Standard (RPS) requiring all utilities and electricity service suppliers for 
Oregon customers to obtain gradually increasing percentages of electricity “from 
qualifying renewable energy sources.”60 These requirements vary for large utilities, small 
utilities, and electricity service suppliers (see Table 1, below). While a number of 
exemptions apply to these requirements (e.g. 4% of annual revenue spending cap for 
utility compliance), the RPS system does feature transparent compliance requirements 
because renewable energy credits (RECs) must be purchased through the Western 
Renewable Energy Generation Information System.61 However, some RPS requirements 
may shift as a result of a recently passed bill, SB 1547B, that expands the state’s RPS to 
50% (for large, investor-owned utilities) by 2040.62 SB 1547B also requires that coal be 
removed from Oregon’s investor-owned utility electricity mix by 2030 and allows 
“Pacific Power and PGE to make prudent investments in charging stations and related 
electric vehicle infrastructure in their service territories.”63 
 
                                                          
59 ORS § 468A.205. 
 
60 Summary of Oregon’s Renewable Portfolio Standard, Oregon Department of Energy (January, 2014), 
http://www.oregon.gov/energy/P-I/docs/RPS_Long_Summary_January%202014.pdf at 1.  
 
61 Renewable Portfolio Standard, Federal Department of Energy, http://energy.gov/savings/renewable-
portfolio-standard-8. 
  
62 Kristen Sheeran, Oregon's plan to trade coal for clean energy—the benefits in detail; Climate Solutions 
(March 15, 2016), http://climatesolutions.org/article/1458070211-oregons-plan-trade-coal-clean-
energy#sthash.vUUNTYhY.dpuf. 
 
63 Id.  
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64 
As previously noted, Oregon could choose to join a multi-state emission reduction 
effort, a decision that could potentially be made easier if Oregon passed carbon pricing 
legislation.65 Duncan’s “system-based” approach would be very appropriate if Oregon 
passed cap and trade legislation. During the 2015 Legislative Session, the Oregon 
Legislature considered HB 3470, a bill that would have enabled a cap and trade system 
applied to large emitters of GHGs. While the bill did not pass, a new version of the bill 
was prepared for the 2016 Legislative Session. Nonetheless, the cap and trade concept 
once again failed to gain traction, with several climate insiders speculating that the deal 
between the investor owned utilities and larger environmental groups in the state to 
expand the RPS gave legislators a less contentious proposal to support. However, many 
doubt that the expanded RPS will have the same impact on emission reductions that a cap 
and trade system would have produced. Of course, the impact of a cap and trade system 
would have depended on where the cap was set and which emission sources would be 
subject to the cap over time. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a pending lawsuit against the State 
of Oregon by youth plaintiffs that could entirely recast the state’s obligation to address 
                                                          
64 Summary of Oregon’s Renewable Portfolio Standard at 1. 
 
65 However, note that it is unlikely that Oregon will pursue a multi-state compliance strategy given the 
state’s preliminary strategy, available here: http://www.deq.state.or.us/aq/climate/docs/epaLcomment.pdf.  
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climate change. This lawsuit, Chernaik v. Brown, asserts that the State of Oregon has 
violated its fiduciary duties under the Public Trust Doctrine by inadequately acting to 
preserve public resources, including the atmosphere, for the benefit of current and future 
generations. The plaintiffs seek a declaration that the atmosphere is a part of the public 
trust and an order that the State of Oregon must complete a climate recovery plan that 
comprehensively considers how the State of Oregon will reduce its GHG emissions in 
line with the best available climate science. Should plaintiffs succeed, the State of 
Oregon will be proportionately responsible for its share of global emission reductions 
necessary to preserve a habitable climate system for current and future generations. The 
case is currently on appeal in the Oregon Court of Appeals.66 
v. Local Emission Reduction Landscape in Oregon 
Oregon follows the concept of municipal “home rule.” In 1906, Oregon voters 
amended the Oregon Constitution to broaden cities’ lawmaking authority through 
municipal charters, and this privilege was extended to counties and county charters by 
another constitutional amendment in 1958.67 Some scholars opine that home rule 
provisions arose as a response to Dillon's Rule, which “posits that cities have no inherent 
powers and possess only those powers specifically delegated to them by state law… [and] 
that courts, when interpreting a delegation from state to city, resolve against the city any 
doubt regarding whether it possesses a particular power.”68 Thus, scholars see the home 
rule provisions of the Oregon Constitution as protection for the substantive lawmaking 
authority of Oregon cities, subject to the limits of preemption.69 
Local initiatives may be seen as violating the mandates of federal or state 
programs, leading to claims of preemption.70  Local laws may be preempted by federal 
                                                          
66 For more information on the current posture and history of this case, see Oregon, Our Children’s Trust, 
last accessed 2-24-16, http://ourchildrenstrust.org/state/Oregon.  
 
67 See OR CONST Art. XI, § 2; see also OR CONST Art. VI, § 10.  
 
68 Paul A. Diller, The Partly Fulfilled Promise of Home Rule in Oregon, 87 Or. L. Rev. 939, 942 (2008). 
 
69 Id. at 945. 
 
70 See, e.g., Paul S. Weiland, Preemption of Local Efforts to Protect the Environment: Implications for 
Local Government Officials, 18 Va. Envtl. L.J. 467, 471 (1999) (“[F]ederal preemption has been applied to 
strike down state and/or local regulations addressing air pollution, hazardous waste management (including 
the transport and disposal of waste and the cleanup of sites contaminated by hazardous waste), nuclear 
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law, typically as a result of the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution, which makes 
federal law the supreme law of the land when there is a conflict of law.71 Federal law can 
expressly or impliedly preempt local actions. Express preemption occurs when Congress 
states in express terms that it is preempting state authority (and therefore by extension, 
local authority).72 If such a preemptive effect is identified, conflict between federal and 
state law results in displacement of the state statute.73 Implied preemption may occur if 
federal preemption is “inferred from a congressional enactment upon the basis of: (1) the 
intent of Congress as revealed by the statutory language and the legislative history; (2) 
the pervasiveness of the federal administrative scheme; (3) the nature of the subject 
matter and the need for exclusive federal regulation to achieve uniformity vital to 
national interest; and (4) the extent to which state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the congressional objectives.”74 An example of implied 
preemption of local law occurred when the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico was sued 
for requiring appliance energy efficiency levels more stringent than required by federal 
law; the court found that these provisions of the city’s Energy Conservation Code were 
preempted by federal law.75If a party claims that a local law is preempted by Oregon state 
law, the court will hear the claim if express preemption has been alleged. The Oregon 
Supreme Court has held that Oregon state law addressing “substantive social, economic, 
or other regulatory objectives of the state” overrides contrary policies of local 
governments if the state law expressly intends to preempt any local regulation in that 
                                                          
power, pesticide use, solid waste management, surface mining, toxic substance control, and water pollution 
control.”). 
 
71 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 
72 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461 US 190, 203 
(1983) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)). 
 
73 See, e.g., 2 L. of Toxic Torts § 11:8 (2015). 
 
74 See, e.g., 2 L. of Toxic Torts § 11:9 (2015) (citing Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 
U.S. 141, 153 (1982) & Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
 
75 Air Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration Inst. v. City of Albuquerque, 835 F Supp 2d 1,133, 1140 
(DNM 2010).  
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area.76 The exception to this is if the state law is “irreconcilable with the local 
community's freedom to choose its own political form.”77 The court will be reluctant to 
hear claims that state law impliedly preempts local law.78 Therefore, express preemption 
by state law is almost always necessary to show that local laws are invalid.79 
Given this precedent, local laws in Oregon can regulate substantive concerns so 
long as they are not so incompatible with existing state regulations that both regulations 
cannot operate concurrently.80  Furthermore, substantive local regulation can be 
implemented in the same area as existent state regulation, regulate more extensively in 
that area, and address different aspects of the same regulatory area so long as such 
regulation is not expressly preempted or incompatible with state law.81  However, in any 
case, local law must be in accord with the state constitution, be minimally compatible 
with state law, and be reasonable.82 
It appears that within the climate mitigation and adaptation realm, the Oregon 
Legislature has only expressly preempted local governments from establishing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission regulations83, or building, electrical, plumbing, and 
mechanical codes which are stricter than state codes.84 Outside of those realms of 
regulation, municipal actions are arguably authorized so long as they are constitutional, 
reasonable, and not incompatible with state law. The following discussion of climate 
                                                          
76 See City of La Grande v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 281 Or. 137, 156 (1978). 
 
77 Id. 
 
78 Id. at 148-49. 
  
79 See City of La Grande v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd. at 153-156; see also The Partly Fulfilled Promise of 
Home Rule in Oregon at 940. 
 
80 See Thunderbird Mobile Club, LLC v. City of Wilsonville, 234 Or. App. 457, 470-71 (2010). 
   
81 Id. at 474.   
 
82 Municipal ordinances in Oregon are generally presumed to be reasonable, “unless the unreasonable 
features are so apparent as to be beyond question,” in which case a court may hold a municipal ordinance 
void for unreasonableness.  Spencer v. City of Medford, 129 Or. 333, 341 (1929).  
 
83 “The Public Utility Commission and the State Department of Energy shall adopt rules as necessary to 
implement ORS 757.522 to 757.536.” 
 
84 See Community Climate and Energy Action Plan: 2013 Progress Report; City of Eugene, 
http://www.eugene-or.gov/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/2385 at 42.  
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commitments by cities illustrates some of the ways that local governments are exercising 
their authority in Oregon, or could do so in the future. 
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 CHAPTER III 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
a. Scholarly Discussion of Local Governments’ Authority to Address Climate 
Change and Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions  
Two key themes animate scholarly discussions of local governance and climate 
change. First, are local actions actually substantive or merely symbolic? Second, how 
does, and how should, local government climate regulation fit within the federalist 
system of government in the U.S.?  
i. Local Government Climate Policy: Substantive or Symbolic? 
Scholars debate whether the impacts of local actions to address climate change are 
substantive or symbolic. The first part of this section discusses why local actions are 
substantive and the second part discusses the symbolic nature of local actions. 
Why Local Actions Are Substantive 
Local governments are empowered by states, through enabling legislation, to 
protect the health, safety, and welfare of citizens through zoning, exert local control over 
many natural resources, and conduct other planning processes.85  Many of the most 
important decisions affecting natural resources and the environment occur at the local 
level, wherein towns, cities and counties decide where, how, and what development may 
occur.  Within the context of climate change, the EPA notes that local communities have 
the power to address climate change through energy efficiency, transportation, 
community planning and design, solid waste and materials management, and renewable 
energy.86 In addition to the EPA’s list, Professor Salkin and others opine that cities also 
can address climate change through carbon sequestration, public education and outreach, 
climate change adaptation, [and the] development of local climate action plans….87 
Below, each of these substantive categories of actions is described in more detail. Note 
                                                          
85 R. M. Krause, Symbolic or substantive policy? Measuring the Extent of Local Commitment to Climate 
Protection. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy (2011), at 48. 
 
86 State and Local Climate and Energy Program, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2012), 
http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/index.html.  
 
87 Patricia E. Salkin, Cooperative Federalism and Climate Change: New Meaning to “Think Globally-Act 
Locally”, 40 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10562, 10563-64 (2010). 
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that there are not bright line divisions between the categories, and that actions in each 
category often interact with actions in other categories. 
1. Energy efficiency 
The International Energy Agency defines energy efficiency as the delivery of 
“more services for the same energy input, or the same services for less energy input.”88 
Energy efficiency in cities may be achieved in the building, transportation, and land use 
sectors. Buildings may be made more energy efficient through the use of “green building 
standards, appliance efficiency standards, loans/grants, incentives for energy retrofits, 
and modified electricity pricing.”89 Increased transportation energy efficiency is achieved 
through investments in infrastructure that reduce congestion and by supporting transit 
forms that make more efficient use of energy than personal automobiles. Land use 
decisions can increase energy efficiency in a variety of ways, including limits on sprawl 
and encouragement of denser development that is better integrated with mass transit 
systems.90 
2. Transportation 
In the transportation sector, cities can address climate change by supporting mass 
transit, electric and other alternative fuel (e.g. natural gas or hydrogen fuel cell) vehicle 
infrastructure, and infrastructure and programs that support walkable and bikable 
landscapes. By taking these actions rather than supporting the transportation status quo 
(personal vehicle travel), cities reduce their expenditures to maintain and expand 
infrastructure that is not only fossil fuel intensive, but also promotes fossil fuel use. 
Changing transportation patterns can revitalize cities by attracting employers and 
employees that value the health and lifestyle benefits of re-developed cityscapes. Local 
governments truly have the ability to re-direct “growth in a new direction” through 
                                                          
88 Energy Efficiency, International Energy Agency (2016), http://www.iea.org/topics/energyefficiency/.  
 
89 Cooperative Federalism and Climate Change: New Meaning to "Think Globally-Act Locally” at 10563-
64.  
 
90 For a more extensive explanation of the connections between land use and energy efficiency, see John 
Nolon; Land Use for Energy Conservation and Sustainable Development: A New Path Toward Climate 
Change Mitigation; Pace University (2012); 
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1791&context=lawfaculty.  
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transportation policies that integrate with sustainable land use and community planning.91 
For example, transportation energy efficiency can be achieved through policy measures 
that contribute to a reduction in vehicle miles travelled (VMT).92 For example, VMT may 
be reduced by promoting “smart growth, infill, increased density, transit- and pedestrian-
oriented design… encouraged telecommuting, [and] bicycling…” among other energy 
efficient land use policies.93 
3. Community Planning and Design 
Professor Salkin opines that “major cultural shifts are possible if local 
governments, as a group, use their land use planning and control authority to plan for and 
implement various green development standards, transit-oriented development strategies, 
and adaptation measures.”94 For example, local governments have significant power over 
the composition of the built environment, and assuming that new development will occur 
as population grows and the construction of the recent past ages, proactive green 
development standards for buildings and other infrastructure are low-cost GHG emission 
reduction strategies.95 These local decisions that affect the built environment are 
important because they are relatively permanent, and “unlike beneficial but shorter-term 
strategies such as carbon taxes, parking fees, and demand management efforts” these 
changes are difficult to repeal.96 
Additionally, some of the most frequently projected impacts of climate change, 
such as drought and increased temperatures, create vulnerabilities for the existing built 
environment and the “sprawl growth development” mindset that produced that 
                                                          
91 Thomas M. Gremillion, Setting the Foundation: Climate Change Adaptation at the Local Level, 41 Envtl. 
L. 1221, 1242 (2011) 
 
92 Cooperative Federalism and Climate Change: New Meaning to "Think Globally-Act Locally” at 10563-
64. 
 
93 Id. 
 
94 Id. at 10565.  
 
95 Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional 
Climate Change Regulation.  Stanford Law Review, 669-746, 713 (2010) (citing Reid Ewing et al., 
Growing Cooler: The Evidence on Urban Development and Climate Change §1.7.3 (2007), available at 
http:// postcarboncities.net/files/SGA_GrowingCooler9-18-07small.pdf., at Executive Summary.) 
 
96 Id.   
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environment.97 Thus, some aspects of this infrastructure may become stranded 
investments, and an increasing number of local governments could find themselves re-
thinking community planning norms. In this re-thinking, there will be opportunities to 
develop plans that result in lower GHG emissions.   
4. Solid Waste and Materials Management 
Many local governments are responsible for waste management processes.98  In 
this sector, there are opportunities to reduce GHG emissions, particularly the potent 
short-term (relative to other GHGs) impact of methane gas from landfills.99 For example, 
waste authorities may install methane gas collectors/digesters that capture the release of 
methane from landfills and use it for municipal energy needs, resulting in a lower impact 
emission stream from both the landfill and the city.100 These efforts can have significant 
impact because, as of 2011, municipal solid waste facilities were the third largest source 
of annual methane emissions in the U.S.101 
5. Renewable Energy 
To the extent that a local government has authority to set siting standards for 
different kinds of development, efforts to install wind, solar, and biomass renewable 
energy may be expedited.102 Local governments also can directly support renewable 
                                                          
97 Setting the Foundation: Climate Change Adaptation at the Local Level at 1237. 
 
98 For example, see OAR 340-093-0010 (“Local government will be expected to assume or provide for 
responsibility in the ownership and operation of any Department/Commission sited landfill under anything 
but an extraordinary circumstance.”) 
 
99 See Shanjun Li., et. al., Assessing the role of renewable energy policies in landfill gas to energy projects, 
Energy Economics (May 2015) Volume 49, 687–697, 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988315001140 at 687.  
 
100 Id.  
 
101 Id. 
 
102 Local governments in Oregon do not have much control over the energy siting process because large 
electric generating facilities are evaluated by the Oregon Department of Energy’s Energy Facility Siting 
Council. See Oregon Department of Energy – Energy Facility Siting Process, 
phttp://www.oregon.gov/energy/Siting/docs/StandardProcess.pdf; see also ODOE: Energy Facility Siting; 
Oregon Department of Energy, http://www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/SITING/Pages/index.aspx.  
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energy by promoting community solar programs, net metering, purchasing renewable 
energy credits, and other cooperative actions between consumers and utilities.103 
6. Carbon Sequestration 
Local governments may support efforts that sequester carbon, such as planting new trees, 
protecting agricultural land that offers significant soil carbon sequestration, and 
protecting forested landscapes through park purchases and other preservation efforts.104 
Additionally, local governments can choose to purchase carbon offsets that reduce 
emissions elsewhere through carbon sequestration, and sometimes these projects may be 
relatively local if qualified offset projects have been established.105 
7. Public Education and Outreach 
Given that local governments cannot require certain sustainable behaviors, 
educating the public through outreach efforts is important.106 While this is challenging 
given limited resources, tools such as social media and interested party email lists allow 
local governments to more efficiently communicate about governmental goals and 
programs to achieve those goals. Professor Krause notes that when local citizens become 
more informed, they may engage as policy entrepreneurs and thus advance local climate 
protection efforts.107  Additionally, demonstrating successful policy to the public through 
educational efforts may lead to greater support for stronger climate regulation within the 
                                                          
103 For more information on community solar programs, see e.g. Community Solar, Oregon Department of 
Energy, http://www.oregon.gov/energy/P-I/Pages/solar/Community_Solar.aspx. For more information on 
net metering, see e.g. Net Metering, Energy Trust of Oregon, https://energytrust.org/shared-
resources/info/solar-net-metering.aspx.  
 
104 For example, see Talking Trees: An Urban Forestry Toolkit for Local Governments; ICLEI: Local 
Governments for Sustainability (2006), 
http://www.milliontreesnyc.org/downloads/pdf/talking_trees_urban_forestry_toolkit.pdf.  
 
105 For example, the Climate Trust sells a variety of offsets in Oregon that Oregon’s local governments 
could support; see Project Portfolio, The Climate Trust, http://www.climatetrust.org/work/portfolio/.  
 
106 However, note that some cities have required residents to adopt certain sustainable behavior or to pay a 
fine; see Ordinances Prohibiting Recyclables in Garbage, Seattle Public Utilities, 
http://www.seattle.gov/Util/MyServices/Garbage/AboutGarbage/SolidWastePlans/AboutSolidWaste/BanO
rdinance/index.htm.  
 
107 Symbolic or Substantive Policy? Measuring the Extent of Local Commitment to Climate Protection at 
46. 
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locality, in other jurisdictions, as well as decreased opposition from industry and other 
groups.108 
8. Climate Change Adaptation 
Some scholars have opined that local populations may be more supportive of 
climate change adaptation than mitigation efforts because local residents see adaptation 
efforts and feel that these projects benefit them.109 Many local adaptation plans choose to 
tackle land use and energy conservation concerns, producing both mitigation and 
adaptation benefits, and “focusing residents' attention to the problem of climate change 
and the consequences of inaction.”110 While there is the risk that local governments and 
residents will conflate and confuse adaptation and mitigation objectives, some scholars 
claim that “all adaptation policy should foster better understanding of climate change, 
better integration and coordination of local government services, and better long-term 
planning capacity.”111 If adaptation policy does indeed produce these benefits, it may 
help establish procedures and institutions that are transferrable to local GHG reduction 
efforts.112  
Adaptation is also a potentially fruitful area for local government efforts because 
adaptation policies “tend to fall within the gambit of traditional local government powers-
-zoning, water and waste management, emergency response….”113 Thus, adaptation 
policies can encourage sustainable practices from the entities that are affected by the 
exercise of these local government powers.114 
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9. Local Climate Action Plans 
Many of the aforementioned categories of actions are set out in local climate 
action plans. 
Professor Trisolini points out that when local governments make additional efforts 
to address climate change, they create competent institutions and bureaucracies that will 
be better able to adapt to whichever state or federal programs are required at a later 
juncture. Another benefit of leading on emission reductions locally is that local citizens 
will become more familiar with programs as they are implemented, which may lead to 
buy-in and the development of capacity to tackle more difficult to implement goals.115 
Finally, local programs can motivate state and national governments to be more 
ambitious, spur climate adaptation, mitigation, and financing, and encourage “an 
emphasis on solutions-directed efforts” in public dialogue about climate change.116 
Why Local Actions Are Symbolic 
Despite the aforementioned substantive steps that local governments may take to 
address climate change and seek to reduce GHG emissions, some scholars argue (and 
many at least recognize) that local government action can be more symbolism than 
substance. For example, although many local governments have pledged to make 
emissions reductions, these pledges are rarely legally obligating, and as Professor Krause 
notes, local governments are reluctant to voluntarily implement policy pledges that have 
local costs, but do not necessarily have local benefits.117 Furthermore, when local action 
requires public support, many local leaders find it difficult to communicate about climate 
change to the general public because climate science is complex and the science does not 
often discuss social or economic implications of status quo policy or policy change.118  
Given that local government emission reduction commitments often rely on voluntary 
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individual actions from members of the public, and these actions usually cannot be 
required by local governments (e.g. riding a bicycle vs. driving a motor vehicle), 
emission reduction pledges may represent symbolic steps rather than substantive 
progress. 
Indeed, Professor Engel opines that many local initiatives to reduce GHGs are 
symbolic because they do little to reduce the risks of climate change, despite providing 
“localized economic and environmental benefits” other than emissions reductions, 
including local advantages for compliance with potential “future carbon regulation 
regimes.”119 Professor Stewart states that subnational climate regulatory “measures may 
be largely symbolic initiatives, pushed by local political entrepreneurs for short-term 
political gain, that will simply not be implemented once their significant costs become 
apparent.”120 Stewart also opines that local efforts may have less to do with addressing 
climate change and more to do with saving money, and that “easy” emission reductions 
become commitments because the costs of these “low-hanging fruit” actions are 
outweighed by the benefits of action.121 Thus, Stewart believes that independent sub-
national actions will not continue beyond the point “where net economic costs become 
significant and outweigh local environmental benefits.”122 
Engel also opines that many local climate change initiatives are abstract because 
of nonbinding and broad provisions that allow “government officials great flexibility in 
timing, scope, and aggressiveness of implementation…”, suggesting “that one of their 
primary functions is to serve as symbolic statements in favor of action addressing climate 
change.”123 Because of this abstraction and perceived symbolism, Engel believes that 
local voters often endorse climate initiatives as a general expression of support for 
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climate action, rather than as an act of approval of private or public expenditures in order 
to implement their preferences.124 In the same vein, local climate change initiatives may 
be political ploys by politicians seeking greater exposure and popularity.125 For these 
reasons, Engel suspects that local climate initiatives are perceived as low-risk because 
local governments can “back off before incurring any costs if other state and localities do 
not adopt similar climate protection measures.”126 Finally, Engel warns that local 
“initiatives could have a placebo effect: the pervasiveness of local initiatives may create 
the impression that something effective is being done.”127 
Why Local Actions Matter Regardless of Substance and/or 
Symbolism 
While the actual substance of local government climate actions is debatable, there 
is the possibility that any substantive success creates a beneficial multiplier effect. At the 
local level, Professor Stewart notes that cities may gain “enhanced energy security and 
lower energy prices by stimulating development of local energy sources…” and that other 
benefits may include “improved transportation infrastructure, green space, building 
efficiency, air quality, and traffic--all of which can at the same time reduce emissions and 
allow for faster economic and residential growth.”128 Local actions can also influence 
larger jurisdictions as well. Stewart believes that sub-national climate regulatory 
initiatives may “demonstrate that it is feasible to reduce emissions at an acceptable or 
even negative cost… [and] that jurisdictions that initiate such measures may reap 
competitive advantages or other co-benefits.”129 
Regardless of whether local climate protection efforts are primarily substantive or 
symbolic, Professor Trisolini wisely notes that “ignoring local governments’ collective 
capacity to reduce emissions may cause the state and federal governments to overlook 
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ways to facilitate proven and sometimes quick reductions that can be accomplished with 
existing technology and established local bureaucracies.”130 Yet, Trisolini is careful to 
temper her optimism with the observation that local government action faces 
constitutional limitations within the U.S. federalist system that limit the overall 
substantive impact of local climate regulatory action.131 Thus, the next section examines 
how local government climate regulatory actions fit within our federalist system.   
ii. Local Government Engagement in Plural Climate Regulatory 
Structures Within the U.S. Federalist System 
This section first lays out the scholarly case for plural climate regulatory 
structures (also referred to as multilevel or stacked approaches), and then discusses how 
such structures fit within the U.S. system of federalism.  
Many scholars believe that more effective environmental governance is achieved 
when a “multilevel approach” or a “plural model” to regulation is utilized.132 While 
scholars note the theoretical advantages of a unitary, top-down climate regulatory system 
(e.g. binding international cap and trade program), many believe that a unitary system 
could take a very long time to emerge, and that a plural system is thus more likely to 
advance climate protection now.133 One of the reasons that a global, or even a national, 
unitary regulatory system for climate protection is unlikely to emerge is that federal 
leadership, particularly congressional leadership, on climate change has been obstructed 
by “the many veto points in the congressional decision-making structure… [which give] 
significant power to organized economic interests to block climate change regulation.”134 
While many veto points also exist in state and local level decision-making, organized 
economic interests may be less able to impede decisions at these levels, perhaps due to 
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inadequate resources, disinterest in the effect of regulations, and/or the diminished impact 
of money spent to influence local decision-makers. 
In the context of GHG emission reductions, one of the primary arguments for the 
plural approach is that if the initial international, federal, regional, or state response to 
climate change is not well-designed and is a regulatory failure, local efforts will 
compensate.135 Such compensation and local experimentation will be an important 
portion of an effective mitigation regime.136 Enabling local competition, cooperation, and 
interaction to tailor regulations to local conditions is a key benefit of a plural regulatory 
system, particularly when so much uncertainty exists about how to optimally design 
climate regulatory systems at any level of government.137 Other benefits include 
“regulatory experimentation, innovation and mutual learning, filling regulatory gaps, and 
… political impetus for progressively stronger regulatory measures.”138 These benefits 
have the potential to kick off “political and market domino effects” that encourage 
increased climate regulation both horizontally among local governments and vertically to 
other levels of government.139 One such benefit could be local governments helping to fill 
gaps that emerge in centralized regulation, perhaps through participation in carbon offset 
and credit systems.140 Given that these systems have not thrived, perhaps due to under 
participation, local participation could trigger a market domino effect. Local government 
participation in local regulatory programs may produce helpful feedback for higher level 
regulatory design.141 
Despite the benefits of plural regulatory designs, there are costs as well. For 
example, compliance by regulated entities may be complicated in a climate regulatory 
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system with multiple layers.142 Also, to the extent that local governments advance new 
policy with costs, such policy may also impose costs on other jurisdictions.143 Another 
potential pitfall is "carbon leakage", whereby carbon intensive capital and industry may 
relocate to areas where there is decreased regulation, or decreased consumption will 
result in cheaper prices that increase consumption elsewhere, thus offsetting any emission 
reductions that may have occurred.144  These downsides are arguably unavoidable 
without a comprehensive state, regional, federal, or international policy that deters other 
local actors from opting out of action. Additionally, some argue “that piecemeal efforts 
can create path dependency, making inefficient small-scale plans difficult to displace 
with a subsequent and more effective comprehensive regime.”145 
Professor Trisolini explains that plans to address climate change and reduce 
emissions at the local level are desirable because they would “not require new 
administrative structures (such as likely will be required by a federal cap-and-trade 
scheme, for example) but rather can be implemented by existing bureaucracies such as 
planning, building and safety, and waste management departments.”146 Yet, as Professor 
Krause notes, there are many supply-side model variables (population, staff expertise, 
policy entrepreneur, per capita budget, etc.) and demand-side model variables (household 
income, political representation, educational attainment, the number of environmental 
non-profits, etc.) that will affect each community’s efforts.147    
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Professor Salkin opines that comprehensively and thoughtfully addressing climate 
change requires a “system of cooperative federalism” where local governments serve as 
“the foundation for implementation and benchmarking” of broader state and federal 
public policy goals.148 According to her, “Global climate change mitigation cannot be 
adequately accomplished without effective, immediate, and coordinated local action.”149 
Similar to Salkin's concept of “cooperative federalism”, Professor Kirsten Engel 
discusses the concept of “dynamic federalism” in the context of environmental 
regulation, and while this scholarship primarily focuses on the interaction of the states 
and federal government, some of her arguments also are applicable to the interaction of 
local governments with the state and federal government. Engel has argued that a system 
of “dynamic federalism” with overlapping authority on regulatory matters promotes 
regulatory innovation and responsiveness, deters governmental capture by interest 
groups, and allows for greater judicial efficiency because courts can abstain from the 
confusion of “jurisdictional line-drawing.”150 She believes that a diffusion of authority 
between governmental bodies leads to greater interest group activity to find policymakers 
that will advance the interest group’s agenda.151   
However, it is important to note that jurisdictional overlap also has downsides, 
primarily a lack of accountability and finality, and potentially inefficient redundancies.152 
Another significant potential downside to overlapping authority is preemption.153 Despite 
the dangers of preemption, in the case of environmental regulation, particularly climate 
regulation, the costs of inadequate regulation of the use of nonrenewable and 
irreplaceable resources are high.154 Thus, it is worth risking preemption to contribute to 
the adequate protection of resources. 
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iii. The Future of Local Government Climate Actions in Oregon 
Given the preceding discussion of climate policy at multiple governmental levels 
and the scholarly assessments of local government climate action, what are local 
governments in Oregon doing? The following assessment incorporates examples of 
actions that local governments in Oregon already are planning to accomplish, as well as 
actions that have been contemplated, and refers back to the introduction’s discussion of 
climate regulatory authority at each governmental level when necessary to contextualize 
these local actions. 
To recap, local governments have the power to address climate change through 
energy efficiency, transportation, community planning and design, solid waste and 
materials management, renewable energy, carbon sequestration, public education and 
outreach, climate change adaptation, and the development of local climate action plans, 
among other actions.155 Primarily referencing Portland and Eugene, Oregon as examples 
(but also incorporating smaller communities where relevant), the following discussion 
highlights key actions Oregon’s cities are taking to address climate change and reduce 
GHG emissions.156 Note that this discussion is not intended to be a comprehensive guide 
to local government actions and strategies in Oregon, but instead highlights actions that 
are either innovative or are representative of actions taken by several or numerous local 
governments. 
1. Energy Efficiency 
Many cities in Oregon encourage energy efficiency by disseminating information 
about state-level rebate and tax credit programs for energy efficient retrofits, as well as 
distributing federal grant monies for energy efficiency projects.157 Cities also directly 
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invest in projects that integrate energy efficient technology such as LED lights.158 
Additionally, the State of Oregon has been a heavy proponent of energy efficiency efforts 
to avoid energy supply issues and the need to build additional electrical generation 
capacity to serve a greater number of consumers. However, it is important to note that 
while “energy efficiency has been the region’s lowest cost resource… it is not expected 
to be sufficient to the task of replacing a substantial amount of coal combustion.”159 Thus, 
energy efficiency efforts alone are unlikely to provide all of the needed additional 
capacity as the state transitions from a reliance on fossil fuel electricity generation to 
clean energy sources. This is one of the reasons why local governments should pursue the 
additional actions that fall under the following categories of local climate initiatives.  
2. Transportation 
Ideas for decreasing emissions from the transportation sector abound. For 
example, as early as 2009, the Oregon Governor’s Climate Change Integration Group 
suggested that local governments be required to consider Vehicle Miles Travelled (VMT) 
in comprehensive plans and in evaluating proposals for development, and also suggested 
that “development credits” could be rewarded for achieved VMT reductions.160 
In 2013, the Oregon Legislature passed ORS 184.895, which directed the Oregon 
Department of Transportation and Department of Land Conservation and Development to 
consult and cooperate with local governments, metropolitan planning organizations, and 
other stakeholders to “establish a toolkit to assist local governments in developing and 
executing actions and programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles 
with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less.”161 This toolkit was required 
to include, among other mandates, implementable programs for local governments, 
information about different actions’ effectiveness at reducing GHG emissions, cost-
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effectiveness of different actions, and educational tools to encourage public buy-in to the 
different actions.162 This toolkit has not yet been completed. 
3. Community Planning and Design 
Recently, several local governments in Oregon have committed to ambitious and 
innovative climate policies. In 2014, the City of Eugene adopted a Climate Recovery 
Ordinance requiring that:  
(1) By the year 2020, all city-owned facilities and city operations shall be carbon 
neutral, either by reducing greenhouse gas emissions to zero, or, if necessary, by 
funding of verifiable local greenhouse gas reduction projects and programs or the 
purchase of verifiable carbon offsets for any remaining greenhouse gas emissions. 
(2) By the year 2030, the city organization shall reduce its use of fossil fuels by 
50% compared to 2010 usage.  
(3) By the year 2030, all businesses, individuals and others living or working in 
the city collectively shall reduce the total (not per capita) use of fossil fuels by 
50% compared to 2010 usage.163  
Furthermore, the ordinance required that the city assess current efforts to reach its climate 
action goals by evaluating (among other things): 
(1) Trends in current energy use for the community and for city operations  
and facilities; and  
(2) Progress in implementing the community climate and energy action  
plan and the internal climate action plan. 
Once this assessment was complete within 12 months of the effective date of the 
ordinance, the city council was required to “establish numerical targets and benchmarks, 
and take other actions that the council determines are necessary, for achieving the 
required reductions….”164 In order to establish these targets, city staff was required to 
provide the city council with: “Numerical greenhouse gas and fossil fuel reduction targets 
equivalent to achieving the related goals…Two-year and five-year benchmarks for 
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reaching the numerical targets…” as well as a proposal for a “numerical community-wide 
goal or ‘carbon budget’ for greenhouse gas emission reductions consistent with achieving 
350 parts per million of CO2 in the atmosphere by the year 2100.”165 All options prepared 
for council decision are required to “include a triple bottom line assessment of the options 
including a cost-benefit analysis.”166  
 After council adoption of targets and benchmarks, the city has the following 
reporting and updating obligations:  
(1) Provide a progress report every two years. 
(2) Provide a comprehensive report every five years that includes an assessment 
of greenhouse gas emission reductions to date and the status in reaching the 
established targets and benchmarks…. 
(3) Update the community climate and energy action plan and the internal climate 
action plan every five years, which shall be based on the updated greenhouse gas 
inventory. 
Under part two of the above requirements, if the city is not reaching adopted targets and 
benchmarks, it must “Conduct an analysis of possible actions to get back on track to  
achieve the next adopted benchmark, together with a triple bottom line analysis of those 
options… [and] Develop for council consideration potential revisions to the plan that 
reflect the necessary actions to achieve the next adopted benchmark.”167 
 More recently, the City of Portland passed two new resolutions. First, the City 
Council resolved to oppose the purchase of corporate securities from fossil fuel 
companies.168 Second, the City Council directed city bureaus “to identify how to use the 
City's authority to restrict the development and expansion of fossil fuel 
infrastructure….169 While neither of these actions is legally binding, they may have a 
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significant impact on the city’s financial contribution to climate change inducing 
activities and the city’s support of fossil fuel infrastructure development that results in 
emissions within the city and in other jurisdictions. 
While the Eugene and Portland community planning and design efforts are 
important, it is worth noting that cities assumed to be less interested in environmental 
initiatives are framing discussions around sustainability. For example, La Grande is 
striving to achieve “a natural resource use pattern which gives as much importance to 
providing for tomorrow's needs and the protection of the natural environment as to 
providing for the needs of today.”170 Another example is Lincoln City’s commitment to 
becoming a carbon neutral community.171 
4. Solid Waste and Materials Management 
The City of Portland’s 2015 Climate Action Plan has four main goals related to 
solid waste and materials management between now and 2030: 1) encourage sustainable 
consumption by residents and to help businesses minimize their supply chains’ carbon 
intensity; 2) reduce the amount of food sent to landfills by 90%; 3) reduce solid waste (on 
a per capita basis) by 33%; and 4) recover 90% of waste generated in the city.172 
Renewable Energy 
5. Renewable Energy 
The City of Lake Oswego has committed to purchasing RECs “for all of its 
Schedule 83 accounts (largest consumers of electricity).”173 Actions like this can have a 
large impact on emissions. According to the city’s analysis of current electricity usage, 
these RECs have an annual emission reduction impact “equivalent to planting 1,065 trees 
or not driving 9,982,036 miles.”174  
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As costs for renewable energy technologies decreases, some local governments in 
Oregon have begun to consider how to support the development of projects that are small 
enough (in terms of energy production) to not require siting approval by the Oregon 
Energy Facility Siting Council. In order to expedite this transition, the Oregon 
Department of Energy has produced a model ordinance for local governments seeking to 
clarify their processes for small-scale energy development.175  
6. Carbon Sequestration 
Portland’s 2015 Climate Action Plan sets two major carbon sequestration goals 
for 2030: a 600-acre aggregate reduction in impervious areas and an expansion of the 
urban forest canopy in order to cover one third of the city, which includes targets for 
minimum canopy coverage in different neighborhood types.176 
7. Public Education and Outreach 
The City of Portland has a variety of short-term (2020) and longer-term (2030) 
goals for engaging the community in its 2015 Climate Action Plan. Most notable among 
these are: aligning the plan with existing community efforts and partnering with the 
community organizations that are leading these efforts, creating a “culturally relevant 
presence” (not defined) at community engagement events, and a conscious effort to 
engage “under-served” residents by providing materials and resources for carbon 
reduction activities.177 
8. Climate Change Adaptation 
Since 2009, it has been Oregon State policy for “local governments, businesses, 
nonprofit organizations and individual residents to prepare for the effects of global 
warming and by doing so, prevent and reduce the social, economic and environmental 
effects of global warming.”178 Local governments such as Portland have responded to this 
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charge by preparing to reduce and mitigate urban heat island effects, develop 
infrastructure that will be more resilient to expected changes in weather and climate, and 
protecting community water supply and quality through efficiency, groundwater 
development forecasting, and greener Stormwater management techniques.179 
9. Local Climate Action Plans 
In 2007, The Oregon Climate Change Research Institute (OCCRI) was 
established and given a directive to “provide technical assistance to local governments to 
assist them in developing climate change policies, practices and programs.”180 It is 
unclear how much OCCRI has helped with this charge. Nonetheless, several cities in 
Oregon, including Portland and Eugene, already have climate action plans and several 
other cities intend to finish plans soon; for example, the City of Ashland plans to 
complete their plan by February 2017,181 and the City of Corvallis has begun the climate 
action planning process. It also appears that the quality of these plans is increasing over 
time as city staff gain expertise and experiment with policy solutions. A great example of 
the state of climate action planning at the local level is Portland’s 2015 Climate Action 
Plan, which presents a well-organized and visually pleasing menu of city actions and 
goals.182  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
The goal of the survey was to learn more about the views of “climate 
policymakers” in Oregon, particularly their opinions about municipal and other local 
government approaches to GHG emission reductions. The “climate policymaker” survey 
population was broadly defined as individuals involved with efforts to reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions in Oregon. This group included: state, county, and local elected 
officials; state and city staff dealing with climate change planning and policy; staff at 
relevant NGOs; and an assortment of community and business leaders. Selection of the 
survey population aimed to equitably represent viewpoints from different regions of the 
state (e.g. Portland Metro, Willamette Valley, Eastern Oregon, Central Oregon, Oregon 
Coast, and Southern Oregon). Climate policymakers were surveyed in order to better 
understand GHG emission reduction goals in Oregon at the state and local level, specific 
policies enacted or proposed to achieve those goals, the degree to which various obstacles 
have stymied progress, and creative approaches that could help achieve and exceed the 
goals. 
The survey was hosted on the Qualtrics survey platform and was distributed via 
email to at least 140 individuals from at least 41 distinct organizational entities. The 
survey may have been distributed to more individuals and organizations if any of the 
survey participants shared the survey without asking permission. However, the survey did 
not allow multiple responses from the same IP address, so any person receiving the link 
was only personally allowed to complete the survey once. Contact information for the 
subjects was obtained through publicly available information on the internet, as well as 
through personal and professional networks. In order to survey staff from local, state, and 
federal governments, written permission was obtained from relevant leadership prior to 
distributing the survey. Participants were alerted at the beginning of the survey that 
completion of the survey constituted their consent to the use of Qualtrics surveying 
software and the inclusion of their responses in the research findings. 
Recognizing that climate change law and policy can be politically contentious, the 
survey built in the maximum amount of confidentiality possible. Due to concerns about 
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participant confidentiality, the list of organizations and individuals that received the 
survey is not disclosed in the research findings or the discussion. Disclosure could allow 
findings to be linked to specific organizations or individuals. The decision to not disclose 
surveyed individuals and organizations, in conjunction with respondent anonymity 
through response anonymization by Qualtrics, eliminated the ability to tie responses to 
any individual (unless the respondent entered personally identifiable information). 
Participants were informed that their responses would become part of the research 
findings and were encouraged to not include personally identifiable information in any 
question that allowed for an open response. Thus, the survey was completely anonymous, 
except for the instances where participants chose to share personally identifiable 
information.  
The survey methodology and questions were inspired by several previous surveys 
administered in Oregon that partially or entirely focused on climate change concerns. 
These include two surveys conducted by Davis, Hibbitts & Midghall, Inc (DHM 
Research) and PolicyInteractive; one was a survey of citizens in Eugene, Oregon on 
climate change and consumption183, and the other was the Oregon Values and Beliefs 
Survey.184 Several questions were also based on a PolicyInteractive survey distributed 
during 2015 to gauge support for a carbon cap and trade bill in the Oregon Legislature. 
Finally, surveying conducted by the Oregon Global Warming Commission as a part of its 
“Roadmap to 2020” report also informed the design of the survey.185   
The survey featured several different types of questions, including forced choice, 
open-ended, and close-ended questions.  Any questions that were placed in a grouping, 
category, or list were randomized so that “order influence” had the least chance to affect 
the results.  This tactic is particularly important for avoiding “agreement answering” bias, 
                                                          
183 Davis, Hibbitts & Midghall, Inc, Climate Change and Consumption Survey.  Available online at 
http://www.eugene-or.gov/DocumentCenter/Index/ (2011). 
 
184 See 2013 Oregon Values and Beliefs Survey, Oregon Values and Beliefs Project (Oct. 2013) 
http://oregonvaluesproject.org/ovp-content/uploads/2013/09/true_north_final_10_7_13.pdf.  
 
185 Roadmap to 2020 Full Report, Oregon Global Warming Commission (2010), 
http://www.keeporegoncool.org/sites/default/files/OGWC_Roadmap_2020_Roadshow_Survey_Phase_1_R
eport_Combined.pdf.  
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whereby participants are primed to answer questions in a predictable way based upon 
their answers to previous questions.  
Participants were asked to complete a survey that featured ten substantive 
questions and nine demographic questions. For the substantive questions, three questions 
were open ended, three questions measured strength of agreement with a statement, two 
questions asked participants to select policy approaches from a list, and two questions 
asked participants to rank categories of policy obstacles and mechanisms. Mixed 
methodology analysis of the questions produced tables and/or graphs for all of the 
multiple choice and otherwise close ended questions. The qualitative analysis focused on 
trends in the responses to the open ended questions, tying quantitative results to the 
qualitative results where possible. Both sets of analyses are located in the discussion 
section. 
The introduction, literature review, and discussion formed the basis for 
synthesized GHG emission reduction recommendations for Oregon’s local governments. 
These recommendations dovetail with existing and contemplated strategies by multiple 
levels of governmental and non-governmental actors, and are featured in the 
recommendations section.  
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CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS 
Note that the following survey results do not appear in the order in which 
questions were presented in the survey. The order of results is not significant because 
some questions were ordered randomly in the survey to diminish the effect of order 
influence. 
a. Demographic Findings 
The survey was completed by 55 participants, but not every participant completed 
every question, as demonstrated by respondent numbers ranging from 51 – 54. To give 
context about the composition of the survey population, brief findings are included on the 
distribution of survey participants’: 1) GHG emission reduction experience; 2) age; 3) 
political party; 4) political outlook; 5) education; 6) household income; 7) city and state 
of residence; 8) ethnic background; and 9) gender. 
 
1. How long have you worked on GHG emission reduction efforts? 
 
0 - 2 years   
 
5 9% 
2 - 4 years   
 
10 19% 
4 - 10 years   
 
18 33% 
More than 10 
years 
  
 
20 37% 
Don't know or 
need more 
information 
  
 
1 2% 
Total  54 100% 
 
2. Please identify which age bracket you belong to:  
 
18-24   
 
2 4% 
25-34   
 
6 11% 
35-44   
 
15 28% 
45-54   
 
7 13% 
55-64   
 
13 24% 
65+   
 
9 17% 
No response   
 
2 4% 
Total  54 100% 
 
 45 
 
3. Which political party do you identify with? 
 
Democrat   
 
40 75% 
Republican  
 
0 0% 
Other   
 
7 13% 
No response   
 
6 11% 
Total  53 100% 
 
4. How would you describe your general political outlook? 
 
Very 
conservative 
 
 
0 0% 
Lean 
conservative 
 
 
0 0% 
Moderate   
 
2 4% 
Lean liberal   
 
16 30% 
Very liberal   
 
30 56% 
Other response   
 
3 6% 
No response   
 
3 6% 
Total  54 100% 
 
5. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
Less than high 
school 
 
 
0 0% 
High school 
diploma or 
GED 
  
 
1 2% 
Associate's 
degree or 
technical trade 
license 
 
 
0 0% 
Bachelor's 
degree 
  
 
21 39% 
Graduate or 
professional 
degree 
  
 
29 54% 
Other   
 
1 2% 
Decline to 
answer 
  
 
2 4% 
Total  54 100% 
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6. What is your household income (all members combined)? 
 
Below $20,000   
 
2 4% 
$20,000 - 
35,000 
  
 
2 4% 
$35,000 - 
60,000 
  
 
4 7% 
$60,000 - 
100,000 
  
 
12 22% 
Above 
$100,000 
  
 
25 46% 
Decline to 
answer 
  
 
9 17% 
Total  54 100% 
 
7. Where do you currently reside? Please include city, state and zip 
code.  
 
Eugene, OR, 97405 Eugene, OR 97402 Bend, OR 97703 
Lane Co. Oregon Cove, OR  97824 Terrebonne, OR 97760 
Eugene OR 97405 97214 Bend, Oregon 97703 
Portland, OR 97217 Portland, Oregon 97213 Bend, OR 97703 
Eugene, OR 97405 Corbett, OR 97019 Seattle, WA 98115 
Eugene, OR 97405 Eugene, OR 97401 Redmond, OR 97756 
Eugene, 97405 Corvallis, OR 97333 Salem, or 97301 
Eugene, OR 97405 Corvallis, Oregon 97333 Salem, OR 97301 
Portland, OR Corvallis, OR 97330 Salem, OR 97302 
Portland, OR, 97202 Eugene, OR 97405 Springfield, OR 97478 
Bend, OR 97703 Portland, OR 97209 Salem, Oregon 97301 
Portland, OR 97211 Corvallis, OR 97330 Bend OR 97702 
Eugene OR 97403 Mercer Island WA 98040 Salem, OR 97301 
Portland, Oregon 97217 Multnomah Portland OR 97202 
Portland, Oregon 97206 97217 Bandon, OR  97411 
 Dallas, OR 97338  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 
 
8. Please note your ethnic background. 
 
Hispanic/latino  
 
0 0% 
American Indian 
or Alaskan 
Native 
 
 
0 0% 
Asian   
 
1 2% 
Black or African 
American 
 
 
0 0% 
Native Hawaiian 
or other Pacific 
Islander 
 
 
0 0% 
White/Caucasian   
 
48 91% 
Multi-racial   
 
4 8% 
Total  53 100% 
 
9. Which gender do you identify with? 
 
Male   
 
25 46% 
Female   
 
27 50% 
Other  
 
0 0% 
No response   
 
2 4% 
Total  54 100% 
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b. Substantive Findings 
1. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement: there should 
be stronger government policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
 
Strongly agree 
  
 
48 89% 
 
Somewhat 
agree 
  
 
4 7% 
 
Somewhat 
disagree 
  
 
1 2% 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  
 
1 2% 
 
Undecided 
(neutral, don't 
know, need 
more 
information, 
etc.) 
 
 
0 0% 
Total  54 100% 
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2. How much do you think that cities in Oregon should reduce their 
GHG emissions? Check all that apply. 
 
As much as necessary 
to meet federal 
requirements under the 
Clean Air Act 
  
 
6 11% 
 
Enough to equitably 
contribute to meeting 
the State of Oregon’s 
goals 
  
 
20 37% 
 
Enough to equitably 
limit global 
temperature increases 
to 2 degrees Celsius (~ 
450 parts per million 
(ppm) of CO2 in the 
atmosphere) 
  
 
9 17% 
 
Enough to equitably 
limit global 
temperature increases 
to 1.5 degrees C (~ 350 
ppm of CO2 in the 
atmosphere) 
  
 
32 59% 
 
As much as possible 
  
 
17 31% 
 
Only as much as their 
citizens or council 
decides they want to 
  
 
5 9% 
 
Undecided  
(neutral, don't know, 
need more information, 
etc.) 
  
 
1 2% 
 
  
 50 
 
3. If you had to choose between policy action to reduce GHGs and policy 
action to adapt to the effects of climate change, which of the two 
would you be most inclined to choose? 
 
 
Strongly 
toward GHG 
reductions 
  
 
25 46% 
 
Lean toward 
GHG 
reductions 
  
 
4 7% 
 
Lean toward 
adaptation 
  
 
1 2% 
 
Strongly 
toward 
adaptation 
 
 
0 0% 
 
Mitigation and 
adaptation are 
not separate 
issues – they 
both must be 
addressed in 
tandem 
  
 
24 44% 
 
Undecided 
(neutral, don't 
know, need 
more 
information, 
etc.) 
 
 
0 0% 
Total  54 100% 
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4. How important is it that local GHG emission reduction policies do not 
harm low-income and vulnerable communities? 
 
 
Very important 
  
 
32 59% 
 
Somewhat important 
  
 
19 35% 
 
Neither important nor unimportant 
  
 
2 4% 
 
Somewhat unimportant 
 
 
0 0% 
 
Very unimportant 
 
 
0 0% 
 
Undecided (neutral, don't know, need more 
information, etc.) 
  
 
1 2% 
Total  54 100% 
 
  
 52 
 
5. From the list of policy mechanisms to address GHG emissions, please 
indicate your opinion of how effective each mechanism is at reducing 
GHG emissions: 
Question 
Not 
effective 
Somewhat 
effective 
Effective 
component of 
set of policies 
Very 
effective 
(with others 
or stand-
alone) 
No 
opinion/unsure 
Total 
Responses 
Carbon tax 
 
3 2 20 28 4 57 
Carbon tax and 
dividend 
 
2 10 13 24 6 55 
Cap and trade 
 
2 7 20 24 2 55 
Carbon budget (no 
emissions trading 
allowed) 
 
6 11 12 14 12 55 
Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS) 
 
0 8 24 16 7 55 
Carbon offsets 
 
7 21 16 2 7 53 
Energy efficiency 
upgrades and 
requirements for 
buildings 
0 7 27 19 1 54 
 
Low-carbon fuel 
standard 
4 13 22 12 3 54 
 
Tax on vehicle miles 
travelled 
6 11 23 8 6 54 
 
Mass transit 
investments 
0 4 33 15 2 54 
 
Incentives and 
programs for 
decreased 
consumption 
economy-wide 
0 18 21 12 5 56 
 
Increased public 
outreach and 
education about 
existing policies 
5 24 22 3 1 55 
 
Further integration of 
climate change 
considerations into 
land use planning 
0 9 26 17 2 54 
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6. In your experience, what degree of difficulty have the following 
obstacles presented for reducing GHG emissions in Oregon's cities? 
 
Question 
Very 
difficult 
Difficult 
Somewhat 
difficult 
Not 
difficult 
No 
opinion/unsure 
Total 
Responses 
Lack of 
business 
support 
 
12 23 14 1 3 53 
Lack of 
public 
support 
 
7 12 20 13 1 53 
Lack of 
political 
support 
 
22 17 12 1 1 53 
Lack of 
technical 
resources 
 
0 13 13 23 4 53 
Lack of 
funding 
 
16 20 10 2 3 51 
Other 
policy 
priorities 
 
18 24 5 0 4 51 
Population 
growth 
5 10 17 12 8 52 
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7. Which sectors do you think Oregon should focus on to limit GHG 
emissions? Select all that apply. If you select "All of the above", please 
deselect any other options. 
 
 
Energy/utilities 
  
 
28 52% 
 
Industry 
  
 
24 44% 
 
Waste management 
  
 
14 26% 
 
Agriculture 
  
 
10 19% 
 
Forestry 
  
 
8 15% 
 
Buildings' efficiency 
  
 
26 48% 
 
Transportation 
  
 
29 54% 
 
Land use planning 
  
 
21 39% 
 
All of the above 
  
 
26 48% 
 
8. What role should the State of Oregon play in supporting local 
government GHG emission reduction efforts? 
1. At least something like what CA did — executive order & CEQA 
procedure that courts have ruled apply to municipalities. Require annual 
carbon budgets based on best available science. Promulgate regulations 
requiring internal city operation carbon reductions & divestment. 
Amending state constitution to explicitly empower cities to adopt 
ordinances that affirm community rights, including the right disallow dirty 
energy production or transportation within city limits. 
2. Help local jurisdictions by passing broad and comprehensive GHG 
reduction mandates. 
3. Eugene, Portland, and others seem to be more aggressive in addressing 
climate change and GHGs. The state should show some leadership in this 
area. Enacting a carbon fee is needed statewide. 
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4. They should support and coordinate local efforts. Especially if those 
efforts can help the state meet its reduction goals. 
5. This is too broad a question to answer effectively here.  Generally, I think 
believe the state should establish an across-the-board carbon tax and then 
transfer some of the revenues to cities to support transitions away from 
carbon intensive technologies and behaviors. 
6. The State should provide the kind of support local governments need to 
effectively implement their initiatives to reduce GHG emissions, whether 
it be technical, expert, or financial support. The State should also 
strengthen its laws and polices enough to equitably limit long-term global 
temperature increases to 1-degree C (~ 350 ppm of CO2 in the 
atmosphere), particularly in the areas the state government has jurisdiction 
but local governments do not. 
7. The state of Oregon should support actions that local governments are 
taking to reduce emissions with technological support, funding sources, 
and skills and expertise.  Furthermore, the state should never stand in the 
way of local governments trying to reduce emissions through preemption. 
8. Funding and allowing for local control if local policies differ from state 
standards but benefit emission reductions 
9. The state should enable local governments to maximize emission 
reductions. There are existing state barriers--like not allowing cities to 
adopt more climate-friendly building codes--that stand in the way of local 
action. 
10. Provide guidance and funding. Make sure its transportation decisions don't 
inadvertently make it harder for local governments to put in the right 
infrastructure. 
11. Create incentives.  Limit sprawl but support Inclusionary Zoning. Define 
"less cost options" to include consideration of externalities to direct the 
work of the OPUC 
12. The state should continue to assist local governments with scenario 
planning at the MPO level.  Funds for energy efficiency projects should be 
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more readily available.  Financial and Technical assistance with waste 
management would also be good. 
13. Setting standards and policy. 
14. Leadership with tighter regulations in each sector with tough penalties; 
public education; support for mass transit; grants & incentives for 
residential solar, energy efficiency, composting to put carbon back into 
soil & tree planting; stronger pollution regs; technology sharing; training 
& education on toxin-free, sustainable ag. 
15. Establish standards or equitable contributions for localities based on 
population toward State goals. This requires the State to establish 
statewide goals. 
16. State should have its own GHG emission reduction goals that cities can tie 
into and meet or exceed. Also should provide technical support for 
monitoring and also funding for additional personnel. 
17. The state should provide model legislation, technical assistance and 
financing for innovative programs. 
18. Supporting communities through revenue for public transit, policies that 
encourage utility/grid innovation (e.g., storage, demand response, and 
investment in EV infrastructure), energy efficiency and renewable energy 
grants, and technical assistance programs such as the Massachusetts Green 
Communities program. 
19. I would like to see the State of Oregon take on an even stronger leadership 
role in combatting global warming. That is one reason why I support a 
coordinated statewide plan, such as the Healthy Climate Bill, currently 
being considered in the short Legislative session. 
20. Regulatory, technical assistance, legislative support, funding. 
21. The State must support local efforts through all means necessary. It should 
require polluters to pay for their pollution, provide technical support to 
communities in their efforts to cut pollution, enforce its existing pollution 
laws, and stop doing the things it does to increase pollution instead of 
decrease it. It should devolve most of its transportation funding to local 
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levels, and tax pollution coming across the borders (from coal energy 
transmission, etc.) 
22. Increased funding for the actions that we have been identified to help 
regions meet their reduction goals. 
23. The State needs to maintain its leadership on this issue because many of 
the most effective strategies (e.g., fuel standards) cannot be implemented 
solely at the local level. 
24. Set targets through statute and administrative rules and require reporting 
on a bi-annual basis with penalties if targets are not met. Also reflect that 
GHG reduction targets be reflected in acknowledged comprehensive 
plans. 
25. mandate planning and policy through administrative rules and statute, 
provide technical assistance, develop financial incentives and 
disincentives. 
26. The State of Oregon should set policies at the state level that direct local 
government to follow suit. 
27. Provide funding & technical assistance. 
28. As supportive as possible, providing guidance and best practices. 
29. Pass a state-wide cap and trade bill that binds us to GHG reduction 
targets! 
30. not sure 
31. State should pass cap and trade and complementary actions to reduce 
GHGs.  Revenues from cap and trade should in part help cities to reduce 
GHGs 
32. Meet the targets of its own Global Warming Commission 
33. The state should set goals and fund mandates 
34. They should pass a state-wide carbon pricing law.  Coal and oil trains 
should be stopped as well as LNG ports.  We need state-wide action to 
support a low carbon future. 
35. Establishing a framework of policies that balances reduction in ghg 
emissions, adaptation, and costs/economic development. 
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36. Oregon state government should be able to provide resources (staff and 
monetary) to local governments in developing their Climate Action Plans. 
Oregon should be able to direct local governments in what are accurate, 
science-based emission reduction goals or GHG budgets that will reduce 
warming to 1.5*C in the long term. These state programs can be funded by 
a carbon tax or cap and trade program. 
37. Seize the opportunity to invest in clean energy technology and create 
policies to transition the entire state to clean energy sources 
38. The state should be leading and coordinating the efforts. 
39. The state of Oregon should lead by example and provide matching funds 
for GHG reduction actions. 
40. Research, evaluation, policy support 
41. Given funding concerns, I'd say that there is not much that the State can do 
for local governments... An easy thing, though - bring back the DLCD 
staffer that helped local governments with greenhouse gas reduction. That 
position was - shockingly - cut last year. 
42. Give direction. Pass laws that guide local government efforts. 
43. An active one - the State and its policies are critical 
44. funding, providing technical assistance 
45. State has a rocky but cooperative working relationship with local 
government.  Use incentives rather than regulation as much as possible. 
46. State should provide a consistent regulatory framework that allows local 
flexibility. 
47. Providing technical assistance including calculating greenhouse 
inventories. 
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9. Should local governments in Oregon wait for larger jurisdictions like 
the State, national or international bodies to adopt stronger 
regulations to reduce GHG emissions before developing new policies? 
1. Absolutely not! 
2. No, but they should also push hard for state, national and international 
actions.  Mainly, local actions are limited by lack of sovereignty. 
3. In absence of the state providing leadership, the answer is no. The state 
needs to take the lead on regulations. Otherwise there will be inconsistent 
requirements from city to city which will be confusing and probably 
ineffective. Given current national politics and congressional dysfunction, 
there will not be stronger GHG emission reduction standards beyond those 
implemented through the Clean Air Act. 
4. No. This problem is too big and too politically complicated to wait for 
others to act. Every level of government has a role to play. 
5. No.  It's fine to proceed in the absence of state or federal policy.  That's 
often the thing that gets state and feds to take action. 
6. No, absolutely not. Strong action taken by local governments to reduce 
GHG emissions NOW, in conjunction with pressure from local 
governments on state and federal governments to take similar action, has 
the potential to influence state and federal action before it's "too late" (in 
terms of tipping points, feedback loops, runaway heating, etc.). 
7. No, while larger jurisdictions continue to delay or implement invective or 
not comprehensive climate policies local governments must step up and 
implement strong regulations to reduce GHG emissions.  Local 
governments will be significantly burdened by the impacts of climate 
change so have a significant stake in reduce emissions.  They can also 
inspire action for larger jurisdictions. 
8. NO 
9. No. Local governments can pilot or pioneer new approaches. 
10. NO 
 60 
 
11. Cities can adopt certain policies to reduce GHG locally, but most effective 
would be concerted support for action by larger jurisdictions, divestment 
and support of community education, 
12. No 
13. No. 
14. No! Local governments must adopt stronger regulations ASAP to show 
legislators & politicians that strong grassroots political will exists. Every 
reduction of GHG emissions counts. All local governments need to act. 
15. No. We can't wait. 
16. No but should work in tandem to the extent possible. 
17. No.  Work has to continue at all levels of government in order to mitigate 
to the levels we need to.  Local action can be rolled up to help the state 
meet carbon reduction goals. 
18. No - action and innovation starts at the local level! 
19. I believe that the issue of global climate change is too urgent of an issue to 
delay meaningful action at any level of society while waiting for 
substantive actions to be formulated and implemented at the national & 
international level.  The cumulative efforts of individuals, communities, 
and local governments, supported by state governments, can be 
implemented much more quickly, and can &do make a real difference. 
20. No 
21. No. This challenge is the defining challenge of our generation, and must 
be acted on my all actors immediately -- without regard to who is not 
acting. 
22. No 
23. While state policies and programs create an important "backstop" for 
GHG reduction efforts, local jurisdictions can move forward with local 
actions if they choose (e.g., city of Eugene) 
24. No, but no action at the federal or state level is no excuse for not doing 
anything. 
25. No. 
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26. No - no reason not to move ahead in the absence of state-level action. 
27. No need to wait. 
28. They should take action as far and as best they can, as they can. 
29. Sadly, no. 
30. no 
31. Yes 
32. No. 
33. No, they should act now 
34. No. Politically movement is mostly likely from the bottom up. 
35. No Necessarily, but it would be more impactful. 
36. NO! 
37. No, because larger jurisdiction are very slow and may miss opportunities 
available at the local level. 
38. No, it is important that every level of government do it's best to assess the 
issue of climate change, involve its citizens, and understand the drastic 
nature of the changes needed. 
39. No! Majors and city councils have jurisdiction to protect the health of their 
citizens. Creating opportunities for clean energy expansion and reducing 
pollution falls within their grasp. 
40. Local government should be acting when politically feasible. 
41. No, states should be leaders until national govt acts. 
42. No 
43. No 
44. No 
45. Of course not 
46. No 
47. NO - No-one can wait - everyone has to do as much as possible as quickly 
as possible. 
48. Local governments should adopt all "no regrets" policies while urging 
adoption of mandatory measures applying to all to address more difficult 
policies. 
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49. Not necessarily 
 
10. Would you like to make a general or specific comment about the 
questions in this survey? All comments are carefully read and 
included in the research findings. 
1. Thanks for doing this! 
2. Some answers should have been mutually exclusive but weren't set up that 
way. Over, nice survey, hope to see the results.  Thanks for working on 
this. 
3. No 
4. Regarding the question about harm to low-income and vulnerable 
communities, GHG emission reduction policies that are strong enough to 
prevent catastrophic climate change are likely to have impacts on all U.S. 
citizens because of our disproportionately large per capita carbon 
footprint. Some people would characterize these impacts as harmful. It is 
very important that these impacts are not disproportionately felt by low-
income and vulnerable communities. 
5. 350 ppm over the long-term aligns with stabilizing at 1 degree C of 
warming with 1.5 C as the peak, but not long-term heating over 
preindustrial temps. 
6. As with most things, the devil is in the details for how effective policies 
can be. A carbon tax of $5 won't be very effective. Targeted policies are 
needed to solve problems in different sectors--there are relatively few low 
carbon alternatives in transportation; it's harder to get individual home 
owners to take action than for a few utilities to make big changes, etc. 
Many policies are meant to be built upon--you can expand an RPS or 
LCFS after it's already been put in place. 
7. I think larger cities can have a large impact, but smaller jurisdictions can 
certainly contribute especially in education and advocacy roles 
8. It would have been helpful to have a brief description of the policy 
mechanisms in order to make better comparisons. I was glad to see 
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agriculture included; chemical farming must be phased out to stop ocean 
dead zones, etc. and regenerative ag replace it to put carbon back in the 
soil. 
9. Great questions.  I am curious to see the answers. 
10. Transportation is the hardest nut to crack -- too many interests push huge 
highway expansions and the alignment of corporate and labor supporting 
such efforts, along with the intuitive appeal of building roads over long-
term community transformation is hard to fight. More climate champions 
support projects like the CRC than any other pollution expansion efforts. 
11. You can find more information on two voluntary ghg scenario planning 
projects in Corvallis and Rogue Valley at 
http://www.oregon.gov/ODOT/TD/OSTI/Pages/scenario_planning.aspx#s
psao 
12. I would love to receive a copy of the results please.  
seanpenrith@gmail.com 
13. Gender is not about being male or female (that's sex). Gender describes 
how we identify with gender norms (e.g. I identify as a man or with 
masculine gender norms). For cisgender people, our sex and gender align 
(male and man) but for trans* and gender queer folks, this is not the case. 
If you were interested in including people who identify as other than 
cisgender, you could change the gender options to man/boy/masculine and 
woman/girl/feminine. 2.Suggest making the racial question checkbox 
14. Please include different options to denote someone's gender (cis-man, 
trans-woman, etc.) "Other" and "No response" can alienate trans and other 
members of the queer community. 
15. On the question about adaption versus GHG reduction: adaption is already 
a given as we are already seeing the effects of climate change. 
16. I feel like the likelihood of passage of a policy might be interesting to 
gauge. For example, carbon tax in Oregon - given our sales tax history - 
might be effective - but pretty unlikely to happen. 
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17. "Caucasian" is not an interchangeable term with "white."  (And white is 
not even an ethnic background; it is one of the skin colors by which 
society has chosen to define groups of people..)"Caucasian" refers to 
people who are ethnically from the Caucasus Mountains region.   I am 
white in color and Irish in ethnicity.  This question needs to be re-written. 
18. Local or grassroots action is especially important in the face of national 
inaction. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
The survey of climate policymakers in Oregon was designed to address several 
research questions. First, what challenges do Oregon’s local governments face in 
reducing GHG emissions? Second, what opportunities exist for Oregon’s local 
governments to further reduce GHG emissions? Third, how much should local 
governments reduce GHG emissions and how should they work with the State of Oregon 
and other governmental bodies? Fourth, should GHG emission reduction efforts focus on 
mitigation or adaptation, and how concerned should policymakers be about impacts to 
low-income and vulnerable populations? Finally, which policy mechanisms are deemed 
to be most effective at reducing GHG emissions? 
In the discussion, responses from the survey’s open response questions are both 
quoted and paraphrased. Where appropriate, observations from previous reports and 
surveys are included to supplement the themes that emerged from survey results. The 
discussion first details demographic trends for survey respondents, then addresses each of 
the research questions, and then concludes with a brief analysis of survey limitations. 
a. Survey Respondent Demographics 
Several demographic questions had interesting results that may help us better 
understand the substantive opinions of participants. First, 70% of respondents had more 
than four years of experience working on GHG emission reduction efforts. Second, 93% 
of the survey population had completed a Bachelors or advanced degree. Third, 68% of 
respondents earned more than $60,000 per year. Fourth, 75% of respondents identified as 
Democrats and 86% said that their general political outlook is “lean liberal” or “very 
liberal.” In contrast, no respondents identified as Republicans or as having a political 
outlook that was conservative. Fifth, despite efforts to recruit survey respondents from all 
around the state, most respondents reported living in Eugene, Portland, Bend, Salem, or 
Corvallis. Taken together, these results represent a survey population that is experienced, 
well-educated, relatively affluent, very liberal, and urban. This composition may not be 
surprising, but it should inform how the subsequent discussion is perceived. 
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Another interesting demographic result was that some 91% of respondents 
identified as “White/Caucasian”, which is substantially higher than the 2014 U.S. Census 
findings that Oregon is 77% White.186 Additionally, no survey respondents identified as 
“Hispanic/Latino”, even though Hispanics were estimated to be 12.5% of Oregon’s 
population in 2014.187 These observations come with the caveat that only 55 individuals 
completed the survey. Nonetheless, it is interesting to consider whether climate 
policymakers in Oregon are statistically representative of the communities that they 
serve. While Oregon is not the most diverse state, the composition of survey participants 
was even less diverse and it is possible that this lack of ethnic diversity among climate 
policymakers may have diminished the reach and effectiveness of policies that have been 
adopted. 
 
b. GHG Emission Reduction Challenges 
i. Obstacles to City-Level GHG Emission Reductions 
Addressing challenges to GHG emission reductions in Oregon’s cities, one survey 
question asked participants to evaluate the degree of difficulty posed by seven potential 
categories of obstacles. These obstacles were: 1) lack of business support; 2) lack of 
public support; 3) lack of political support; 4) lack of technical resources; 5) lack of 
funding; 6) other policy priorities; and 7) population growth. Note that there was a slight 
difference (plus or minus 2 respondents) in the number of responses across obstacle 
categories. For each of the following categories for degree of difficulty, the obstacles are 
ranked and the number of selections is shown in the parentheses: 
“Very difficult”: 
1. Lack of political support        (22) 
2. Other policy priorities        (18) 
3. Lack of funding         (16) 
4. Lack of business support       (12) 
                                                          
186 See United States Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/00,41.  
 
187 Id.  
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5. Lack of public support       (7) 
6. Population growth         (5) 
7. Lack of technical resources       (0) 
 
“Difficult”  
1. Other policy priorities        (24) 
2. Lack of business support       (23) 
3. Lack of funding        (20) 
4. Lack of political support       (17) 
5. Lack of technical resources       (13) 
6. Lack of public support        (12) 
7. Population growth       (10) 
 
“Somewhat difficult”: 
1. Lack of public support       (20) 
2. Population growth       (17) 
3. Lack of business support       (14) 
4. Lack of technical resources      (13) 
5. Lack of political support       (12) 
6. Lack of funding        (10) 
7. Other policy priorities        (5) 
 
Combined “very difficult”, “difficult”, and “somewhat difficult” degrees of difficulty: 
1. Lack of political support       (51) 
2. Lack of business support       (49) 
3. Other policy priorities       (47) 
4. Lack of funding        (46) 
5. Lack of public support       (39) 
6. Population growth       (32) 
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7. Lack of technical resources      (26) 
 
“Not difficult”:  
1. Lack of technical resources       (23) 
2. Lack of public support       (13) 
3. Population growth        (12) 
4. Lack of funding        (2) 
5. Lack of business support; and  
lack of political support       (1) 
7. Other policy priorities        (0)  
 
“No opinion/unsure”: 
1. Population growth       (8) 
2. Lack of technical resources; and 
Other policy priorities       (4) 
4. Lack of funding; and 
Lack of business support       (3) 
6. Lack of public support; and 
Lack of political support       (1) 
 
ii. Trends in City-Level Obstacles to Reducing GHG Emissions 
These responses demonstrate a number of trends. First, the most-selected 
difficulties seem to be particularly interrelated. Examining the collated results for “very 
difficult”, “difficult” and “somewhat difficult”, the top four obstacles were lack of 
political support, lack of business support, other policy priorities, and lack of funding. 
One relationship between these obstacles is that political support may be lacking because 
support is focused instead on other policy priorities, leading to insufficient funds. Funds 
also may be lacking because of business’ disinterest in policies that could hurt their 
profitability and competitiveness. Indeed, many policies proposed to reduce GHG 
emissions could arguably impose short-term costs on businesses and consumers. At least 
for some portions of the public, the message that GHG emission reductions will 
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negatively affect businesses and consumers is enough to diminish support. While lack of 
public support did not ascend to the top tier of obstacles, survey respondents showed 
fairly strong support for the notion that a lack of public support makes GHG emission 
reductions “somewhat difficult.” 
Outside of the trends that emerged from the collated obstacle difficulty, several 
important findings emerged for obstacle categories that respondents deemed to be “not 
difficult.” One of the main findings is that policymakers do not believe that technical 
resources are lacking for GHG reduction initiatives. Another interesting finding is that a 
sizable portion of respondents did not identify a lack of public support as a substantial 
obstacle to local GHG emission reduction efforts. Similarly, while it seems that 
policymakers are becoming concerned about population growth, many do not think that 
population growth is a limiting factor for GHG emission reductions. However, this 
observation is tempered by the high number of respondents that did not have an opinion 
or were unsure about the difficulties presented by population growth. 
 
c. GHG Emission Reduction Opportunities 
i. Emission Reduction Relationship Between the State of Oregon and 
Local Governments  
In order to better understand the relationship between the State of Oregon and 
local governments for reducing GHG emissions, the survey asked climate policymakers 
“What role should the State of Oregon play in supporting local government GHG 
emission reduction efforts?” Responses to this question can be organized into six 
categories. First, many participants suggested that the state adopt some form of carbon 
pricing. Second, several respondents suggested that the state require local governments to 
take certain actions. Third, a few participants suggested that the state give local 
governments greater flexibility to adopt innovative policies. Fourth, many respondents 
wanted the state to take a greater leadership role in coordinating local emission reduction 
efforts. Fifth, many participants argued that the state should increase funding for local 
government programs. Finally, several respondents suggested that the state emphasize 
economic opportunities for local governments engaging in climate initiatives. 
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1. Adopt Carbon Pricing 
Many respondents to this question emphasized that some form of carbon pricing 
is needed, whether that be a carbon fee, an “across-the-board carbon tax”, a price on 
pollution that polluters are required to pay, or a binding statewide cap and trade program. 
 
2. Require Local Actions 
A wide variety of state requirements for local action were proposed. For example, 
respondents suggested that the state: require local governments to institute “annual 
carbon budgets based on the best available science”; “explicitly empower cities to adopt 
ordinances that affirm community rights”, such as a right to ban fossil fuel projects; 
require biannual reporting on progress toward local emission reduction targets, 
incorporate those targets into acknowledged comprehensive plans, and enforce penalties 
if the targets are not met; and require that local governments contribute to state-level 
emission reduction policies.  
3. Give Local Governments More Flexibility 
The primary concern of respondents was that the state has already preempted 
some aggressive emission reduction actions by local governments or could do so in the 
future. One respondent stated that the state “should never stand in the way of local 
governments trying to reduce emissions….” Other respondents believed that local control 
should be allowed to differ from state standards if they have emission reduction benefits, 
with one respondent opining that “The state should enable local governments to 
maximize emission reductions. There are existing state barriers--like not allowing cities 
to adopt more climate-friendly building codes--that stand in the way of local action.” 
Leading into the next category, one respondent noted that the state “should provide a 
consistent regulatory framework that allows local flexibility.”  
4. Increase State Leadership and Coordination of Local 
Governments 
An interesting corollary of some climate policymakers’ desire for increased local 
government flexibility is the desire to have the state take a leadership role, particularly in 
the coordination of local government policies. This is the category where the chorus sang 
the loudest in support of a changed dynamic between the state and local governments on 
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GHG emission reduction initiatives. Respondents were in favor of state leadership to: 
develop comprehensive and balanced framework for GHG reduction mandates, embodied 
in regulations across sectors; coordinate and support (including technical and financial) 
local initiatives; assist with scenario planning; establish equitable GHG reductions for 
each locality based upon population and enforceable state goals; provide model 
legislation and best practices for local governments; and supervise local implementation 
of statewide policies.    
5. Increase Funding for Local Governments 
Another popular desire among respondents was for the state to provide additional 
financial support to local governments for emission reduction initiatives. Suggestions for 
funding took a number of forms, including: better availability for energy efficiency and 
renewable energy funds (perhaps through grant mechanisms); state funding of additional 
personnel to help cities develop climate action plans and meet GHG emission reduction 
goals; “financing for innovative programs” and programs with demonstrated emission 
reduction success; mass transit funding; and funding for any emission reduction mandates 
that are passed from the state to local governments (perhaps through matching funds). 
Respondents’ favored suggestion for a new funding stream was statewide adoption of a 
carbon pricing mechanism, with distribution of some portion of system revenue to local 
governments; however, one person thought that local governments should be given more 
control over transportation spending.  
6. Incentivize and Emphasize Economic Opportunities 
Respondents did not offer specific proposals for incentives that the state 
government could offer to local governments, but a respondent did point out that 
incentives should be used in lieu of regulation as much as possible. Another respondent 
also opined that the state should “seize the opportunity to invest in clean energy 
technology and create policies to transition the entire state to clean energy sources.”  
 
d. GHG Emission Reduction Ambitions and Intergovernmental Relations 
i. Stronger GHG Regulations? 
When asked whether “there should be stronger government policies to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions”, 89% of survey respondents (out of 54 responses) strongly 
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agreed and an additional 7% of respondents somewhat agreed with the statement. Only 
4% of respondents somewhat or strongly disagreed. This shows a very high level of 
agreement among Oregon’s climate policymakers that current governmental policies are 
not strong enough. 
 
ii. City GHG Emission Reduction Expectations 
Following up on respondent’s desire to reduce GHG emissions, the survey asked 
how much “cities in Oregon should reduce their GHG emissions”, allowing multiple 
options to be selected; thus, percentages do not sum to 100% but rather indicate how 
many participants selected an option in comparison to the total number of participants for 
the question. The option receiving the most support (59%) was GHG emission reductions 
consistent with equitably limiting global temperature increases to 1.5° Celsius (C) and 
returning carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere to 350 ppm of CO2.
188 It is 
important to note that “equitably” was not defined and that respondents likely differed in 
their perception of what would be equitable. The second most popular selection (37%) 
supported emission reductions that “equitably contribute to meeting the State of Oregon’s 
goals.” The view that cities should reduce emissions “as much as possible” received the 
third highest number of selections (31%). A substantial number of respondents (17%) 
supported local governments equitably limiting global temperature increases to 2° C and 
long-term atmospheric concentrations of CO2 to 450 ppm. 
What do these numbers show? First, it seems that Oregon’s climate policymakers 
broadly support “equitable” emission reductions, differing only on what the baseline and 
the final target for equitable reductions should be. However, this is not a trivial 
difference. Equitably contributing to limiting global temperature increases to 2° C or 
atmospheric concentrations to 450 ppm is likely to be much more difficult than equitably 
contributing to the State of Oregon’s emission reduction goals. Second, respondents 
offered weak support (9%) for local governments reducing emissions “as much as their 
citizens or council decides they want to”, perhaps recognizing that this could result in 
                                                          
188 A respondent noted that policies to put us on track back toward 350 ppm of CO2 in the atmosphere 
would result in a 1.5 C° peak over pre-industrial temperatures, but that the temperature would not remain at 
that point. 
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minimal emission reductions in reticent communities. The majority of respondents also 
desired to be more ambitious than the federal Clean Air Act requires, with only 11% 
saying that cities should reduce their emissions by this amount only. These results show 
that respondents are in favor of stronger policy action that equitably aligns with larger 
jurisdiction’s emission reduction commitments.  
iii. Should Local Governments Wait for Larger Jurisdictions Before 
Developing New Emission Reduction Policies? 
Respondents resoundingly answered “no.” Only one respondent said that local 
governments should wait because the absence of state guidance will lead to inconsistent 
and ineffective regulations from locality to locality. The support for local government 
initiatives regardless of larger jurisdictions’ regulatory agenda can be broken down into 
three broad categories. First, respondents suggested that local action will encourage 
larger jurisdictions to take action. Second, any feasible level of local action should be 
pursued because climate change requires the maximum possible amount of collective 
actions. Finally, local action can trigger innovative approaches. 
1. Encouraging Larger Jurisdictions to Be More Ambitious 
Respondents emphasized that “every level of government has a role to play” and 
that local actions are “often the thing that gets [the] state and feds to take action.” 
Participants also felt that this local pressure could inspire state and federal action “before 
‘it’s too late’”, demonstrating to “legislators and politicians that strong grassroots 
political will exists.” However, these sentiments were tempered with the 
acknowledgement that the most effective approach to reducing emissions “would be 
concerted support for action by larger jurisdictions….” 
2. Local Governments Should Do Everything Feasible to Reduce 
Emissions 
One respondent nicely summed up the sentiments of many by saying that “Local 
governments should adopt all ‘no regrets’ policies while urging adoption of mandatory 
measures applying to all to address more difficult policies.” An area with few regrets may 
be preparing for the effects of climate change, which one participant noted will 
significantly burden local governments. Other respondents believe that local governments 
should pursue climate initiatives in order to fill the perceived void left by insufficient 
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federal and state policy. Doing so increases the chances of the state meeting its emission 
reduction goals and helps governments “understand the drastic nature of the changes 
needed.” 
3. Local Government Initiatives Can Encourage Innovation 
Given that local initiatives may be scaled up quicker than state or federal policies, 
some respondents contended that local action captures opportunities to reduce emissions 
that would otherwise be emitted under state or federal legal frameworks. Respondents 
also emphasized that local actions could serve as pilot projects that breed innovation in 
other localities and at larger levels of government and business.  
 
e. Mitigation, Adaptation, and Impacts on Low-Income and Vulnerable 
Populations 
When asked to choose between policy action to reduce GHGs (commonly 
referred to as “mitigation”) and policy action to adapt to the effects of climate change, 
53% of respondents favored GHG reductions (46% strongly and 7% lean toward), and 
only 2% of respondents leaned toward adaptation. However, some 44% of respondents 
supported the view that “Mitigation and adaptation are not separate issues – they both 
must be addressed in tandem.” 
In this question, “effects of climate change” were not defined. What participants 
included in the realm of an “effect” and the timescale on which each of those effects 
would occur undoubtedly varied, and thus likely affected participants’ forced choice 
between supporting mitigation and adaptation. However, the purpose of asking the 
question was to see how many policymakers supported either side of the mitigation-
adaptation dichotomy, if adaptation was gaining ground as a choice, and if policymakers 
saw mitigation and adaptation as connected issues.  
While it is interesting to see that nearly 50% of policymakers saw mitigation and 
adaptation as connected issues, in retrospect it seems that even more respondents may 
have chosen this response if the question had been worded in a way that did not suggest a 
forced choice between either mitigation or adaptation. Thus, this question may have been 
poorly designed to accurately capture feedback, especially from rushed survey 
respondents. One conclusion that is encouraging, however, is that very few respondents 
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were of the opinion that adaptation should take precedence over mitigation. While some 
believe that resources will be stretched thin merely trying to adapt to unavoidable 
climatic changes, leaving little room to mitigate emissions, it is possible that the 
difficulties of adapting will be compounded without mitigation efforts that reduce 
emissions and brunt the severity of additional climatic changes that may still be 
avoidable. Perhaps many of Oregon’s climate policymakers agree with this opinion. 
When asked about the importance of local GHG emission reduction policies not 
harming “low-income and vulnerable communities”, 94% of respondents said this 
concern was either very or somewhat important. Despite the broad support from 
policymakers, one survey respondent noted that “GHG emission reduction policies that 
are strong enough to prevent catastrophic climate change are likely to have impacts on all 
U.S. citizens because of our disproportionately large per capita carbon footprint…” and 
that these impacts could be considered “harmful” by some. Nonetheless this respondent 
emphasized that policies should be designed to not disproportionately impact low-income 
and vulnerable communities.  
 
f. Effectiveness of GHG Emission Reduction Policy Mechanisms  
One survey question gauging effectiveness of policy mechanisms to address GHG 
emissions provided useful insight into policy opportunities for Oregon. This question 
asked participants to specify how effective 13 policy mechanisms were at reducing GHG 
emissions, with effectiveness ranging from “not effective” to “very effective (with others 
or stand-alone).” The policy mechanisms offered were: 1) carbon tax; 2) carbon tax and 
dividend; 3) cap and trade; 4) carbon budget (no emissions trading allowed); 5) 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS); 6) carbon offsets; 7) energy efficiency upgrades and 
requirements for buildings; 8) low carbon fuel standard; 9) tax on vehicle miles travelled; 
10) mass transit investments; 11) incentives and programs for decreased consumption 
economy-wide; 12) increased public outreach and education about existing policies; and 
13) further integration of climate change considerations into land use planning. Note that 
there was a slight difference (plus or minus 3 respondents) in the number of responses 
across policy mechanism categories. For each effectiveness category, the policy 
mechanisms are ranked and the number of selections are in parentheses. 
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“Not effective” at reducing GHG emissions:  
1. Carbon offsets        (7) 
2. Carbon budget (no emissions trading allowed); and 
Tax on vehicle miles travelled      (6)  
4. Increased public outreach and education about existing policies  (5) 
5. Low carbon fuel standard       (4)  
6. Carbon tax        (3) 
7. Carbon tax and dividend; and 
cap and trade        (2) 
8. Mass transit investments; and 
RPS; and 
Energy efficiency upgrades and requirements for buildings; and   
Incentives and programs for decreased consumption economy-wide; and 
Further integration of climate change considerations into land use planning 
          (0) 
“Somewhat effective” at reducing GHG emissions:  
1. Increased public outreach and education about existing policies  (24) 
2. Carbon offsets        (21) 
3. Incentives and programs for decreased consumption economy-wide (18) 
4. Low carbon fuel standard       (13) 
5. Tax on vehicle miles travelled; and  
Carbon budget (no emissions trading allowed)    (11)  
7. Carbon tax and dividend       (10) 
8. Further integration of climate change considerations into land use planning 
          (9) 
9. Renewable portfolio standard (RPS)     (8) 
10. Cap and trade; and 
Energy efficiency upgrades and requirements for buildings  (7) 
12. Mass transit investments       (4) 
13. Carbon tax        (2) 
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“Effective component of set of policies” at reducing GHG emissions:  
1. Mass transit investments       (33) 
2. Energy efficiency upgrades and requirements for buildings  (27) 
3. Further integration of climate change considerations into land use planning 
          (26) 
4. Renewable portfolio standard (RPS)     (24) 
5. Tax on vehicle miles travelled      (23)  
6. Low carbon fuel standard; and 
Increased public outreach and education about existing policies  (22) 
8. Incentives and programs for decreased consumption economy-wide (21)  
9. Carbon tax; and 
Cap and trade        (20) 
11. Carbon offsets        (16) 
12. Carbon tax and dividend       (13) 
13. Carbon budget (no emissions trading allowed)    (12)   
 
“Very effective (with others or stand-alone)” at reducing GHG emissions:  
1. Carbon tax        (28)  
2. Carbon tax and dividend; and 
Cap and trade        (24) 
4. Energy efficiency upgrades and requirements for buildings  (19) 
5. Further integration of climate change considerations into land use planning 
          (17) 
6. Renewable portfolio standard (RPS)     (16) 
7. Mass transit investments       (15) 
8. Carbon budget (no emissions trading allowed)    (14)  
9. Low carbon fuel standard; and        
Incentives and programs for decreased consumption economy-wide (12) 
11. Tax on vehicle miles travelled      (8) 
12. Increased public outreach and education about existing policies  (3) 
13. Carbon offsets        (2) 
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“No opinion/unsure” about effectiveness for reducing GHG emissions:  
1. Carbon budget (no emissions trading allowed)     (12) 
2. Renewable portfolio standard (RPS); and 
Carbon offsets        (7) 
4. Carbon tax and dividend; and        
Tax on vehicle miles travelled      (6) 
6. Incentives and programs for decreased consumption economy-wide (5) 
7. Carbon tax        (4)  
8. Low carbon fuel standard       (3) 
9. Cap and trade; and 
Mass transit investments; and 
Further integration of climate change considerations into land use planning 
          (2) 
12. Energy efficiency upgrades and requirements for buildings 
Increased public outreach and education about existing policies  (1) 
Several trends emerged from this question about the effectiveness of policy 
mechanisms. First, while a low percentage of respondents thought that any of the policy 
mechanisms were “not effective”, carbon offsets and carbon budgets without emissions 
trading attracted the most skepticism. That skepticism was also reflected in the “no 
opinion/unsure” category, where a carbon budget without emissions trading and carbon 
offsets were again the most selected mechanisms.  
Second, carbon pricing policy mechanisms were the most popular selections in 
the “very effective” category. This shows that nearly half of the surveyed climate 
policymakers in the state believe that a carbon pricing mechanism is the best choice for a 
“very effective” GHG emission reduction policy mechanism. Interestingly, support for a 
carbon tax, carbon tax and dividend, and cap and trade were relatively equal among 
respondents.    
Third, policy mechanisms with less projected impact on GHG emissions than the 
carbon pricing policies were the most popular selections for the “effective component of 
a set of policies” category. Specifically, mass transit investments, the renewable portfolio 
standard, further consideration of climate change in land use planning, and energy 
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efficiency stood out as effective component policies. In conjunction with each of these 
policy’s moderate support in the “very effective” category, it is clear that retaining a 
commitment to each of these policy approaches is likely to be supported by the climate 
policymaker community.  
Several open response comments about policy mechanisms and their perceived 
effectiveness are also important to consider. One respondent noted that “the devil is in the 
details for how effective policies can be…” and that “many policies are meant to be built 
upon…”, specifically renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and low carbon fuel standards 
(LCFS). This comment on scalability of certain policies suggests that additional research 
into perceptions of appropriate policies may be desirable. A lack of understanding among 
participants about the finer details of the policies may have skewed selections.   
Another respondent stated that transportation emissions are the “hardest nut to 
crack” because many interests “push huge highway expansions” and corporate and labor 
interests are often aligned to do so. This response implicates the power of business and 
labor interests and the effect of population pressure. One respondent also opined that 
“larger cities can have a large impact, but smaller jurisdictions can certainly contribute 
especially in education and advocacy roles.” Thus, perhaps this question on policy 
mechanisms and other questions could have been designed to differentiate between 
smaller and larger jurisdictions.  
 
g. Limitations of Survey Results 
The major limitations of the survey were: 1) the breadth of the questions; 2) the 
small number of respondents and the potential that the survey population is not 
representative of the climate policymaker community; 3) invalidation of some data based 
on survey design; and 4) the phrasing of certain demographic questions may have 
alienated some respondents.    
The survey questions were relatively broad, especially the questions that allowed 
for an open response. Broad questions were chosen to encourage completion of the 
survey and to allow for creative responses. However, this approach diminished the length 
and effectiveness of some participant’s responses. For example, one respondent opined 
that the question about the State of Oregon’s role in supporting local governments with 
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GHG emission reductions was “too broad a question to answer effectively here.” Given 
the limited responses to the broad questions, this critique applies equally to other broadly 
worded questions. Nonetheless, some open responses were very insightful, so it is 
possible that the broad framing of questions had more positive than negative impacts.     
The impact of the survey results is unclear given that only 55 individuals 
responded to the survey. While 55 responses out of 140 survey invitations is not an 
unusually low response rate, the initial vision of the survey envisioned greater 
participation from the climate policymaker community. However, in retrospect, most of 
the identified population of climate policymakers were strong supporters of GHG 
emission reduction policies, so perhaps the results would not have been much different 
with more participation from people with potentially similar views. A larger limitation on 
the results may be that few respondents were opposed to the idea of more extensive 
climate policy. It is entirely possible that individuals that do not believe in climate change 
or have reason to oppose GHG emission reductions can be just as, or even more, 
influential on the success or failure of climate policy in Oregon and in Oregon’s cities. 
Although the survey was distributed to policymakers that have been skeptical of claims 
that state and local climate policy are inadequate, the demographic results do not suggest 
that many of these individuals chose to complete the survey. Ultimately, the survey 
results should not be construed as representing the aggregate viewpoint of the climate 
policy community in Oregon. 
Regarding survey design, one survey respondent pointed out that some of the 
survey answers should have been set up in a mutually exclusive manner that did not 
allow participants to choose multiple answers. Unfortunately, the criticism is valid, and 
as a result of this criticism, one of the survey questions had to be thrown out and there are 
several others that are not as targeted as they could have been. The specific question with 
severe limitations asked: “Which sectors do you think Oregon should focus on to limit 
GHG emissions? Select all that apply. If you select “All of the above”, please deselect 
any other options.” When the survey was first launched, the instruction for the “All of the 
above” selection was not included, which possibly led to inaccurate selections of other 
options, and opened up the possibility of double counting. Thus, the results from that 
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question are not discussed. However, the results are still included in the findings (see part 
II of the findings section, #7).  
Finally, some respondents also took issue with the demographic questions, which 
may have led to less engagement with other survey questions. For example, the lack of 
gender options beyond “male”, “female”, “other”, and “no response” was potentially 
alienating, and one respondent noted that gender is about gender norms, not biological 
sex. The question about ethnic background also was criticized for mixing racial, cultural, 
and ethnic categories.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The following GHG emission reduction strategies were produced by considering 
the structural trends of climate policy at different governmental levels, the policy 
frameworks suggested by leading scholars of local government climate initiatives, the 
current status and proposed expansion of local climate initiatives in the state, and survey 
feedback from 55 of Oregon’s climate policymakers. 
This section sets forth eight categories of recommendations: 1) revisit past 
studies; 2) align the climate agenda with other local priorities; 3) advocate for funding; 4) 
enhance information sharing and transparency; 5) promote collaboration; 6) consider new 
governance bodies; 7) incorporate social and environmental justice; and 8) apply pressure 
to the state and federal government. These recommendations are not exhaustive, but 
instead illustrate the themes that local governments in Oregon should consider in 
developing their strategies to reduce GHG emissions. As in previous sections of this 
paper, the categorization of recommendations is not mutually exclusive and information 
overlaps. 
By point of comparison, the Oregon Global Warming Commission’s (OGWC) 
2015 report to the legislature offered the following recommendations: 
We conclude with several recommendations for the state, and its policy leaders, 
specifically: set a 2035 interim goal; develop a strategy with interim benchmarks 
to achieve that goal; carefully consider cost and equity when setting the long-term 
strategy; encourage technological innovation when implementing the strategy; 
prioritize action from the largest emitters; support and leverage action at the 
federal level, and consider adopting parallel reduction goals for the emissions 
associated with Oregonians’ consumption of goods.189 
This thesis’s recommendations differ because they are primarily focused on local 
government initiatives rather than statewide policy; however, there are two broad 
                                                          
189 Biennial Report to the Legislature 2015, Oregon Global Warming Commission (2015), 
http://www.keeporegoncool.org/sites/default/files/ogwc-standard-
documents/OGWC_Rpt_Leg_2015_final.pdf at 6.  
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similarities between the two sets of recommendations. First, both are concerned with 
policy that is equitable over the long-term. Second, both recognize the importance of the 
federal government in advancing policy outcomes.  
1. Revisit Past Studies 
There is no shortage of information and suggestions on how to improve climate 
change policy in Oregon. For over 10 years, multiple state and non-governmental entities 
have been producing lengthy, but useful reports, several of which speculate about the role 
of local governments. Reviewing relevant studies decreases the likelihood that 
unintended policy consequences will occur and increases the creativity of current 
policymakers by exposing them to the ideas of the not too distant past. The following 
excerpted observations were chosen because they deserve additional emphasis (despite 
already being implemented in local policy) or because the ideas were never publicly 
acted upon. 
One source of information is the 2009 Governor’s Climate Change Integration 
Group Report. The noted said that all government agencies should be encouraged, and 
perhaps required, to prepare and initiate climate preparation plans.190 It is unknown how 
many entities completed such plans, but it is a beneficial business practice to have 
governmental agencies explicitly preparing for climate change. In addition, the report 
also suggested that “localized climate change assessments that focus on impacts of a 
changing climate, adaptation and preparation needs, and mitigation opportunities…” 
should be developed.191 Although the Oregon Climate Change Research Institute has 
conducted regional and statewide climate assessments, it appears that localized climate 
change assessments have not yet been developed.192 There are examples of federal 
programs such as the U.S. Geological Survey’s National Climate Change Viewer that 
could inspire state specific resources focused on impacts, preparation, and mitigation 
opportunities.193 
                                                          
190 Final Report to the Governor: A Framework for Addressing Rapid Climate Change at 7. 
 
191 Id. at 9 & 20. 
 
192 See Reports, Oregon Climate Change Research Institute, http://occri.net/reports 
 
193 National Climate Change Viewer; United States Geological Survey; last modified Dec. 10, 2015; 
http://www.usgs.gov/climate_landuse/clu_rd/nccv/viewer.asp.  
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Following these assessments, the Governor’s Climate Change Integration Group 
Report recommended that the Legislature “Establish and fund a program of technical 
assistance to assist local governments to devise climate change action plans including 
policy, practices, and programs specific to the concerns of Oregon communities.”194 
Again, it does not appear that this recommendation led to action. Local governments 
should remind state-level policy makers that this kind of support would be valuable, and 
that the entities which could provide the support, such as the Oregon Global Warming 
Commission and the Oregon Climate Change Research Institute, will likely need more 
funding to do so. This forgotten recommendation is important because so few Oregon 
communities have formal climate change action plans. 
Revisiting past reports like the Governor’s Climate Change Integration Group 
Report may help illuminate the unintended consequences that certain policies could 
produce. For example, the Oregon Climate Change Adaptation Framework report from 
2010 noted that “As the state continues to reduce emissions, there is some risk that 
mitigation policies will be considered without sufficient appreciation for how those 
policies might perform under changing climate conditions, or whether they will restrict 
future choices of how to adapt to those changes.”195 As an example of a policy that could 
restrict future choices, the report offered a concern that an emphasis on using biofuels 
rather than petroleum in the transportation sector could reduce land available for carbon 
sequestration.196 Careful consideration of these types of complex interactions is 
especially important in the local government context because of local governments’ 
potentially more direct interaction with, and accountability to, local citizens and 
businesses (in comparison with state and federal government). 
2. Align the Climate Agenda with Other Local Priorities 
As seen in the discussion section of this thesis, the top four obstacles for reducing 
GHG emissions at the local government level are a lack of political support, a lack of 
business support, other policy priorities, and a lack of funding. The following suggestions 
                                                          
194 Final Report to the Governor: A Framework for Addressing Rapid Climate Change, Appendix 2 at 3.  
 
195 Oregon Climate Change Adaptation Framework, State of Oregon (Dec. 2010) 
http://www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/GBLWRM/docs/Framework_Final_DLCD.pdf, at 85. 
 
196 Id.  
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are ideas for diminishing these obstacles and making progress with local climate 
initiatives.  
In an excellent report on developments in urban clean energy initiatives, Climate 
Solutions noted that many urban leaders are attempting to diminish political opposition 
by aligning climate initiatives with other community concerns “such as air quality, 
transportation, social equity, economic development, and climate change resilience.”197 
One of the most prevalent concerns in Oregon’s communities is how to respond to the 
immigration influx into the state, especially in the largest cities.198 The Oregon 
Governor’s Climate Integration Report long ago stressed that Oregon should be prepared 
to beneficially integrate climate refugees into local economies.199 The systems that the 
state and local governments use to accommodate population growth and facilitate 
economic opportunities will have a large impact on future GHG emissions. The next 
three suggestions illustrate interconnected systems that implicate a range of local 
concerns including GHG emission reductions. 
First, the state of Oregon’s land use system has a huge impact on the emission of 
GHGs. Recently questions have again emerged about whether the state and local 
governments will remain committed to a restrictive land use system that discourages 
urban sprawl, makes low emission public transit systems increasingly viable, and protects 
valuable agricultural and forest landscapes. Even though this land use system has 
arguably encouraged socially-stratified economic development, it also has GHG emission 
reduction benefits. The OGWC’s 2011 report to the legislature found that in 
“Comparisons between urban areas that expand land areas and those that restrict urban 
growth to inside existing growth boundaries… vehicle miles of travel and GHG 
emissions can be reduced up to 20 percent over 20 years at growth rates between one to 
two percent per year [in urban areas with growth boundaries].”200 On balance, integrating 
                                                          
197 Elizabeth Willmott, The Urban Clean Energy Revolution, Climate Solutions (November 2015), 
http://climatesolutions.org/sites/default/files/uploads/pdf/urban_clean_energy_revolution_web.pdf at 2.  
 
198 See Report pegs Oregon as top state for in-migration. Can Portland handle all the new arrivals? Portland 
Business Journal (January 2, 2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/portland/blog/real-estate-
daily/2015/01/report-pegs-oregon-as-top-state-for-in-migration.html.  
 
199 Final Report to the Governor: A Framework for Addressing Rapid Climate Change at 5 & 19. 
200 Report to the Legislature 2011, Oregon Global Warming Commission (OGWC), 
http://www.keeporegoncool.org/sites/default/files/ogwc-standard-documents/2011Report.pdf at 50. 
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our knowledge of climate change into local concerns such as this tips the balance in favor 
of retaining compact growth policies, but local governments should be prepared to 
produce and defend programs that offset the impact of these policies upon vulnerable 
populations. Fortunately, this effort has already begun and the Oregon State Legislature 
recently authorized local governments to include inclusionary zoning requirements for 
new development projects.201  
Second, local governments could consider carbon offsets because Oregon has a 
great deal of forest and agricultural land that sequesters carbon and prevents additional 
emissions from development.202 Local governments could support the creation of high 
quality carbon offsets that help protect the values behind Oregon’s land use system, 
promote business opportunities in rural communities, and ease the compliance pathway 
for regulated entities should a carbon pricing system allowing for the use of offsets be 
developed. While some challenge the effectiveness of carbon offsets as emission 
reduction mechanisms, the carbon offset market is growing and Oregon communities 
have an opportunity to directly benefit from participation in an increasingly global market 
that already has a strong foothold in the Western U.S.203 There are also a range of co-
benefits that may accrue from the support of carbon offset projects, “including reduced 
reliance on fossil fuels, habitat conservation, biodiversity protection, job creation, water 
quality improvement, and improved local air quality.”204 However, carbon markets are 
complex and difficulties are bound to arise with the interplay of emission reduction 
policies at different institutional levels. Thus, local governments desiring to promote or 
participate in the carbon offset market should simultaneously balance skepticism and 
trust in offsets as a component of their emission reduction portfolio.205 
                                                          
201 Chris Lehman, Oregon Lawmakers Vote to Lift Ban On Inclusionary Zoning Laws, Oregon Public 
Broadcasting (March 3, 2016), http://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-housing-law-inclusionary-zoning/.  
 
202 Final Report to the Governor: A Framework for Addressing Rapid Climate Change at 10. 
 
203 For more information on the number of offsets issued for cap and trade compliance in California, see 
Compliance Offset Program, California Environmental Protection Agency, Air Resources Board, last 
visited 2-28-16, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm.  
 
204 Gordon Levitt and Tom Bowerman, Voluntary Carbon Offsets for Small Jurisdictions at pg. 7 (Long 
Version, Working Paper V7), PolicyInteractive (October 17, 2014), available upon request.   
 
205 Id. at 11.  
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Third, further research and explanation of the economic opportunities associated 
with climate change mitigation and adaptation could spur investment and local support. 
The 2010 Oregon Climate Change Adaptation Framework report opined that “there is a 
lack of solid information on economic opportunities that may be generated by changing 
climate conditions…there is significant need to quantify anticipated opportunities.”206 
While this statement understandably focused on economic opportunities stemming from 
adaptation, there is certainly room for a greater number of utilities and local governments 
in Oregon to also explain the economic benefits of climate mitigation. 
3. Advocate for Funding 
This recommendation may be the most crucial because it enables funding of 
additional local government climate initiatives. It may also be the most frustrating 
because it requires securing statewide or national political support. 
Due to persistent funding issues, local governments are hard-pressed to make and 
support investments that reduce GHG emissions, even if these investments have a high 
likelihood of saving the government money over time.207 This thesis’s survey results 
verified that insufficient funding was a major concern among respondent Oregon climate 
policymakers. A solution that survey respondents envisioned was to adopt a statewide 
carbon pricing system that would simultaneously reduce emissions and generate revenue 
that could fund local initiatives. Suggestions included a carbon tax, a carbon tax and 
dividend, and a cap and trade program, each of which received nearly equal support as 
policy mechanisms that would be “very effective” at reducing GHG emissions. However, 
local governments should be aware of some of the pros and cons for each of these carbon 
pricing mechanisms so that they can align their support behind the most appropriate 
mechanism. 
 
 
                                                          
206 Oregon Climate Change Adaptation Framework, State of Oregon (Dec. 2010) 
http://www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/GBLWRM/docs/Framework_Final_DLCD.pdf, at 83.  
 
207 For a general overview of local fiscal challenges in Oregon, see Fiscal Challenges for Oregon’s Cities, 
ECONorthwest (Sep. 2011), 
http://www.orcities.org/Portals/17/Publications/SpecialPubs/Fiscal_Challenges_for_Oregon_Cities_FINAL
.pdf.  
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Carbon Tax 
One of the reasons that a carbon tax makes sense is that globally-speaking, 
“Businesses see that carbon pricing is the most efficient and cost effective means of 
reducing emissions….”208 Many of Oregon’s businesses appear to be heading toward 
agreement with this sentiment, with 400+ companies having already signed the Oregon 
Business Climate Declaration, which asserts that “tackling climate change is one of 
Oregon’s greatest economic opportunities of the 21st Century.”209 Additionally, our 
neighbor to the north, the province of British Columbia (B.C.), Canada has successfully 
administered a revenue neutral carbon tax since 2008. Admittedly, a revenue neutral 
carbon tax would probably not provide additional revenue to Oregon’s local 
governments, so the calculations for the political viability of a revenue boosting carbon 
tax in Oregon may not be bolstered by this example. However, B.C.’s experience does 
demonstrate that a carbon tax is politically viable for a subnational jurisdiction, and could 
be viable in Oregon because Oregon and B.C. have similar population, geographical, and 
economic makeups.  
Despite the advantages of business support for the carbon tax and the existing 
successful example from B.C., there are several sections of the Oregon Constitution that 
may stymie the viability of a carbon tax. Article IX, § 3 and Article VIII, § 2 of the 
Constitution are important because they potentially limit how a carbon tax addresses 
more than 90% of Oregon’s CO2 emissions.210 Each section is discussed in detail below. 
 
                                                          
208 Statement: Putting a Price on Carbon, The World Bank, 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Carbon-Pricing-Statement-060314.pdf, last 
accessed 8-6-15. 
 
209 Sign the Oregon Business Climate Declaration, Ceres, last visited 4-17-16, 
http://www.ceres.org/declaration/sign/oregon-business-climate-declaration.  
 
210 For information on Oregon’s CO2 emissions see State CO2 Emissions: By Energy Sectors, Energy 
Information Administration (Feb. 25, 2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/state_emissions.cfm; see also State CO2 Emissions, 
Oregon, Energy Information Administration (Feb. 25, 2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/state_emissions.cfm. 
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Article IX, § 3a directs all revenues (with limited exceptions) from taxes on motor 
vehicle fuel or use211 to the State Highway Fund.212  This revenue (with limited 
exceptions) must be used “exclusively for the construction, reconstruction, improvement, 
repair, maintenance, operation and use of public highways, roads, streets and roadside 
rest areas in this state.”213  Furthermore, the statute for the State Highway Fund states that 
“the highway fund shall be deemed and held as a trust fund, separate and distinct from 
the General Fund, and may be used only for the purposes authorized by law. . . .”214  A 
carbon tax affecting motor vehicle fuel or use accrues to the State Highway Fund, which 
likely cannot be used to fund alternative transportation spending because many of those 
expenditures have not been found to contribute to the “operation and use” of public 
thoroughfares, as required by the Oregon Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article IX, § 
3a.215 
Article IX, § 3b states that tax rates on oil and natural gas shall not exceed six 
percent of the market value of each resource, excluding sources covered by Article IX, § 
3a.216  Relevant language includes:  
Any tax or excise levied on, with respect to or measured by the extraction, 
production, storage, use, sale, distribution or receipt of oil or natural gas, or the 
ownership thereof, shall not be levied at a rate that is greater than six percent of 
                                                          
211 Or Const, Art IX, § 3a (1) (Taxes on motor vehicle fuel and use include: “any tax levied on, with respect 
to, or measured by the storage, withdrawal, use, sale, distribution, importation or receipt of motor vehicle 
fuel or any other product used for the propulsion of motor vehicles; and any tax or excise levied on the 
ownership, operation, or use of motor vehicles.”).    
 
212 ORS 366.505 (detailing the composition of the State Highway Fund); see also Highway Revenues 
Apportionment, Oregon Department of Transportation, 
http://www.oregon.gov/ODOT/CS/FS/pages/hwy_rev.aspx#Highway_Revenues_Apportionment.        
 
213 Or Const, Art IX, § 3a (1). 
 
214 ORS 366.505.  
 
215 Auto.  Club of Oregon v. State, 314 Or 479, 494 (1992) (stating that funding public transportation from 
taxes on motor vehicle fuel and registration was impermissible – in part because Oregon voters had three 
times rejected proposed amendments to Article IX, § 3a that would permit these taxes to fund public 
transportation.).   
 
216 Or Const, Art IX, § 3b. 
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the market value of all oil and natural gas produced or salvaged from the earth or 
waters of this state as and when owned or produced.217   
There is confusion about the scope of “produced or salvaged from the earth or waters of 
this state as and when owned or produced.” In order to determine market value and the 
scope of §3b, it is still not known whether this statement applies only to natural gas and 
oil produced in the state of Oregon, or whether it also applies to all natural gas and oil 
consumed in the state, regardless of where it was produced.218 
Oregon produces very little natural gas or petroleum,219 so it is critical to know 
whether Article IX, § 3b applies to all oil or natural gas consumed in Oregon.220  The 
answer to this question is important because natural gas use accounted for nearly 30% of 
Oregon’s CO2 emissions in 2011, with more than 97% of those emissions coming from 
outside of the transportation sector.221 Also, around 10% of CO2 emissions from 
petroleum products were emitted outside of the transportation sector and around 15% of 
Oregon’s petroleum product consumption was not related to transportation.222  In total, 
around 35% of Oregon’s total CO2 emissions (based on 2011 data) appear to fall outside 
of the scope of Article IX, § 3a, and may thus be subject to the tax rate limitations of 
                                                          
217 Id.   
 
218 Nw. Natural Gas Co. at 382 (“We decline to suggest whether. . .  [Article IX, §3b] does apply only to 
taxes on oil and natural gas extracted within this state because this question is not necessary to our 
resolution of this case.”).  
 
219 In 2013, Oregon produced 770 million cubic feet of natural gas and had no documented production of 
petroleum.  See Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production, U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(October 31, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dcu_sor_a.htm; see also Oregon State 
Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. Energy Information Administration (June 19, 2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.cfm?sid=OR.     
 
220 Excluding the transportation sector, Oregon’s natural gas consumption in August of 2014 was 16,797 
million cubic feet and petroleum consumption in 2012 was at least 9,906,000 barrels or around 15% of 
Oregon’s total petroleum consumption, see Natural Gas Consumption by End Use, U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_cons_sum_dcu_SOR_m.htm; 
see also Table CT3.  Total End-Use Energy Consumption Estimates, 1960-2012, Oregon, U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (June 27, 2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/state/seds/data.cfm?incfile=/state/seds/sep_use/tx/use_tx_OR.html&sid=Oregon.    
 
221 See State CO2 Emissions, Oregon, http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/state_emissions.cfm. 
 
222 See Total End-Use Energy Consumption Estimates, 1960-2012, Oregon, 
http://www.eia.gov/state/seds/data.cfm?incfile=/state/seds/sep_use/tx/use_tx_OR.html&sid=Oregon. 
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Article IX, § 3b.223  Although the method for calculating the limitation is unknown, it is 
difficult to imagine how a carbon tax designed for long term emission reductions would 
effectively function with a six percent limitation on the tax rate. Article VIII, § 2 (1)(g)224 
directs tax revenue from oil or natural gas outside of the scope of Article IX, §3 to the 
Common School Fund. Similar to Article IX, §3b there is uncertainty about whether this 
constitutional command only applies to in-state production of oil and natural gas, or if all 
oil and natural gas tax revenue is affected.   
Ultimately, the impact of these constitutional provisions could be that revenue 
from a tax affecting oil or natural gas would go to the State Highway Fund and the 
Common School Fund, and some portions of such a tax would have tax rate limits. This 
means that revenue would not be directly distributed for the purpose of reducing GHG 
emissions. In order to rectify these issues, Oregon legislators have unsuccessfully 
attempted to pass constitutional amendments on several occasions.225 The OGWC also 
recommended legislative action in 2009 to “create a fund statutorily dedicated to 
investments in Oregon’s non-highway transportation needs”226, presumably to escape the 
strictures of the State Highway Fund. This sentiment was again echoed in the 2011 
OGWC report: “To make critical investments in transportation infrastructure, operations 
and programs that will enable us to meet our GHG reduction goals, we need new sources 
of funding that are diverse, stable, predictable and flexible….”227 Oregon’s current 
constitutional framework likely makes a carbon tax a risky approach if revenues are 
desired for non-highway or educational purposes. 
                                                          
223 State CO2 Emissions, Oregon, http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/state_emissions.cfm. 
 
224 Or Const art VIII, § 2 (“After providing for the cost of administration and any refunds or credits 
authorized by law, the proceeds from any tax or excise levied on, with respect to or measured by the 
extraction, production, storage, use, sale, distribution or receipt of oil or natural gas and the proceeds from 
any tax or excise levied on the ownership of oil or natural gas.  However, the rate of such taxes shall not be 
greater than six percent of the market value of all oil and natural gas produced or salvaged from the earth or 
waters of this state as and when owned or produced.  This paragraph does not include proceeds from any 
tax or excise as described in section 3, Article IX of this Constitution.”). 
 
225 See HJR 33, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or 2011); See also HJR 48, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or 2009).   
 
226 Report to the Legislature 2009, Oregon Global Warming Commission, 
http://www.keeporegoncool.org/sites/default/files/ogwc-standard-documents/09CommissionReport.pdf at 
28. 
 
227 Report to the Legislature 2011 at 46. 
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Carbon Tax and Dividend 
Another potentially more effective carbon tax proposal – short of amending the 
constitution – lies in Article IX § 3a (2)(a) and in the first sentence of Article VIII, § 2 
(1)(g), noting that revenue from applicable taxes may be used “for the cost of 
administration and any refunds or credits authorized by law.”228 Thus, a carbon tax and 
dividend approach whereby tax revenues are returned to citizens via a dividend 
mechanism could be legal, so long as the dividend was a legal refund or credit. 
A refund is defined as “a repayment; the return of money paid;”229 and a credit may be 
defined as “to offset (a sum of money) against an amount of money owed or due; 
(now) esp. to offset (a sum of money paid) against a tax liability.”230  Unfortunately, 
neither the Oregon Department of Revenue nor the Oregon statutes on Revenue and 
Taxation appear to have an explicit definition of refund or credit, and the term 
“authorized by law” is nowhere explained. Despite the ambiguity of this section, it is 
arguable that if a new tax credit or refund were created by the legislature, revenue could 
be directed away from the State Highway Fund and given to Oregon residents. Whether 
residents would use this dividend in a way that would reduce GHG emissions is debatable 
and this proposal does not secure any revenue for state or local governments to fund 
climate initiatives.   
Cap and Trade 
Finally, cap and trade systems have been proposed to the Oregon legislature on 
several occasions, most recently in the 2016 short legislative session and the 2015 regular 
legislative session.231 While these proposals have thus far failed, there are advantages to 
                                                          
228 Or Const, Art IX, § 3 and Or Const, Art VIII, § 2. 
 
229 See Refund, n., Oxford English Dictionary, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/161129?rskey=metyct&result=1&isAdvanced=false#footerWrapper.  
 
230 See Credit, v., Oxford English Dictionary, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/44114?rskey=bBKMni&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid.  For a list of 
currently available tax credits in Oregon, see Personal Income Tax Overview, Oregon Department of 
Revenue, http://www.oregon.gov/dor/PERTAX/personal-income-tax-overview/pages/credits.aspx.   
 
231 See House Bill 4068, 78th Oregon Legislative Assembly, 2016 Regular Session, 
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2016R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/HB4068/Introduced; see also HB 
3470, 78th Oregon Legislative Assembly, 2015 Regular Session, 
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2015R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/HB3470/B-Engrossed.  
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advocating for a cap and trade system. First, California has been implementing a 
successful cap and trade system since 2007 and it could be easy to learn from their 
example and to collaborate with their efforts.232 Second, a majority of jurisdictions that 
have adopted carbon pricing systems globally have adopted a cap and trade system. Thus, 
if Oregon adopted a cap and trade system, it could be easier to collaborate with other 
jurisdictions and to comply with a national cap and trade system should one be instituted. 
In addition, Oregon could join a larger cap and trade carbon market, achieving economies 
of scale and buying down the cost of compliance for Oregonians.  Complying with a 
carbon price law in this way could prove significantly less expensive than a go-it-alone 
strategy. Last, there is the possibility that a cap and trade system would avoid the 
constitutional limitations noted in this paper. It appears that such a system could initially 
avoid the strictures of Article IX, §3a because motor vehicle fuel sources would not be 
included in the first compliance period.233  However, it is unknown whether an Oregon 
court would consider a cap on GHG emissions to be a tax on the sources that produced 
those emissions, thus triggering constitutional limitations.   
However, there are also several potential issues with a cap and trade system. 
Some of the main reasons why the proposals may not have passed is a concern that 
Oregon’s businesses will be less competitive, causing carbon leakage that will stymie real 
aggregate emission reductions as businesses relocate to other jurisdictions with fewer 
emission restrictions. As the 2009 OGWC report to the legislature explained:  
Many of Oregon’s primary manufacturing employers produce global commodities 
(e.g., steel, cement, pulp and paper). These companies are price takers in global 
markets, not price setters, and may be disadvantaged competitively by such 
leakage effects. How can Oregon and other WCI [Western Climate Initiative] 
participants anticipate and address economic hardship to these companies that 
may be materially and adversely affected by competition from areas not subject to 
WCI cap and trade regulation? How can Oregon and other WCI participants deal 
                                                          
232 For more information on California’s cap and trade program, see Summary of Final Rules for 
California’s Cap and Trade Program, International Emissions Trading Association (February 14, 2012), 
http://www.ieta.org/assets/US-WG/ieta_summary_of_california_ct_regulations.pdf. 
 
233 Id. at 1. 
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with carbon content from goods imported from areas not subject to WCI cap and 
trade regulation?234 
Green Municipal Bonds 
Outside of the carbon pricing context, some cities in the U.S. have generated new 
funding by levying taxes and issuing bonds.235 Portland, Oregon has expressed interest in 
issuing green municipal bonds, and may issue a bond sometime during 2016.236 Other 
cities in Oregon should watch how Portland’s bonding effort plays out, and if resources 
are available, perhaps monitor other city-level financial trends for green financing.237 
Local governments may also want to investigate sources such as the Climate Bond 
Initiative’s The Green City Playbook238 and the U.S. EPA’s Getting to Green: Paying for 
Green Infrastructure report.239 
4. Enhance Information Sharing and Transparency 
Previous climate governance regimes, such as those inspired by the Kyoto 
Protocol framework, tiered their emission reductions to a 1990 emission baseline. Now, 
with the emergence of more flexible and diverse schemes for describing emission 
reduction targets (e.g. INDCs and local government participation in global reporting 
systems), it is more important than ever that data be shared to enhance transparency and 
accountability. 
                                                          
234 Report to the Legislature 2009 at 36. 
 
235 See Neha Bhatt and Michael Ryan; Carbon Energy Tax: Boulder, CO; Smart Growth America; last 
accessed 2-28-16, http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/Boulder-Carbon-Tax.pdf; see also 
Building a green muni bond market that will finance the development of low carbon and climate resilient 
US cities, Climate Bonds Initiative, last accessed 2-28-16, https://www.climatebonds.net/get-
involved/green-city-bond-campaign/US.  
 
236 Greenlight for Green Bonds in City of Portland, C40 Cities (August 4, 2015), 
http://www.c40.org/blog_posts/greenlight-for-green-bonds-in-city-of-portland.  
 
237 For example, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change aims to increase city-level 
climate finance globally. See The Cities Climate Finance Leadership Alliance (CCFLA): Closing the Low-
carbon, Resilient Urban Investment Gap, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/cities-subnationals/the-cities-climate-finance-leadership-alliance-
ccfla/, last accessed 2-7-16.  
 
238 The Green City Playbook, The Climate Bond Initiative (July 2015), 
http://www.climatebonds.net/files/files/Green%20City%20Playbook.pdf.  
 
239 Getting to Green: Paying for Green Infrastructure; U.S. EPA (December 2014), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/gi_financing_options_12-2014_4.pdf.  
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While the survey showed that few climate policymakers in Oregon believe that 
technical resources are lacking for GHG emission reduction initiatives, that does not 
mean that local governments are aware of and using the technical resources that do exist. 
Tools and frameworks that promote information sharing between local governments 
should be encouraged. Doing so will be necessary to develop and achieve the equitable 
emission reduction plans that climate policymakers broadly supported in their survey 
responses. 
Value has already been created by entities such as ICLEI sharing policy between 
different levels of government and private institutions around the globe.240 Some of the 
key policies for sharing include methodologies for inventorying and tracking GHG 
emissions within a local government’s jurisdiction. Improved mechanisms for tracking 
and managing emissions continue to emerge; for example, ClearPath Global, a free and 
collaborative online mechanism for inventorying emissions, was recently released.241 
Data tools have also been developed to aid certain categories of emission reduction 
efforts, such as The U.S. Department of Energy’s Cities Leading through Energy 
Analysis and Planning Project, which “delivers standardized, localized energy data and 
analysis that enables cities to lead clean energy innovation and integrate strategic energy 
analysis into decision making.”242 
As early as 2009, the Oregon Global Warming Commission (OGWC) noted 
several data challenges for local government climate initiatives, including lack of clarity 
on what local governments were expected to contribute to state GHG emission reduction 
goals, and insufficient understanding of local carbon footprint data, particularly for 
commercial operations and residents.243 In response to this, the OGWC hoped “to 
disaggregate the State’s reduction goals down to local governments and work with them 
to design responses that will leverage their unique capabilities and access to citizens.”244 
                                                          
240 See Setting the Foundation: Climate Change Adaptation at the Local Level at 1232; see also ICLEI 
USA, http://icleiusa.org/.  
 
241 ClearPath Global, last accessed 2-28-16, http://www.clearpath.global/.  
 
242 Cities Leading Through Energy Analysis and Planning, U.S. Department of Energy, last accessed 2-28-
16, http://energy.gov/eere/cities-leading-through-energy-analysis-and-planning.  
 
243 Report to the Legislature 2009 at 4 & 8. 
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Again in 2011, the OGWC recognized that data should be disaggregated geographically 
and in a consistent manner, such that local governments could effectively design 
responses that comprise a least cost pathway for contributing to the achievement of 
statewide emission reduction goals.245  
Data from this type of a disaggregation effort does not publicly exist, even though 
such data would be incredibly useful. Informing communities of their unique and tailored 
responsibility to contribute to state goals (and maybe enforceable laws at some point in 
the future) would promote equity and allow citizens to pressure cities, and for cities to 
hold other cities accountable for their responsibilities. In Eugene, Oregon, city 
sustainability staff were required to disaggregate Dr. James Hansen’s global CO2 
reduction plan down to the local level in order to form a carbon budget for the city.246 
While the initial results were shocking, finding that Eugene will likely exhaust its carbon 
budget within five years (if 2013 emission levels hold steady), they have provided 
Eugene’s leaders and broader citizenry a framework for what may be required to preserve 
a habitable climate given the predictions of today’s best available climate science. Given 
the number of GHG sources in Oregon and the lack of emission data for much of the 
state, an accurate and equitable disaggregation of local responsibility across the state 
could prove difficult, but it is worth attempting this effort. As the Oregon Global 
Warming Commission noted in 2009, “Since carbon emissions are a product of most of 
our business and personal activities, an equitable distribution of costs is critical to the 
success of and public support for any strategy.”247  
Many local governments are intimidated by the task of developing goals or 
committing to pledges to reduce GHG emissions, but tools are available. It is increasingly 
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apparent that difficult to achieve GHG emission reductions will be accelerated by robust 
transparency systems that allow all governments to confidently claim emission reductions 
in a way that avoids double counting and promotes confidence in regulatory systems. 
Several such systems are already up and running, including the Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP) and the Carbonn Cities Climate Registry (cCR). The cCR was developed 
in 2010 to help local government climate action to be transparent, accountable and 
comparable, and so that local data is “consistent with the standards of the global climate 
regime.”248  The cCR also is a forum for local governments to present their commitments 
to reduce GHGs, performance in doing so, and the actions that made the results possible. 
As of February 2016, only three cities in Oregon were participating in the cCR: Portland, 
Beaverton, and Hillsboro.249 
 While both of these global initiatives are taking place on the meta scale of 
emission reduction policies, there are other more localized policies that cities might 
consider, such as passing “ordinances that require large commercial building owners and 
managers to report their energy consumption annually, either to the city or publicly.”250 
Regardless of the method that local governments use to report their climate 
commitments, transparency will be important to measure and verify implementation and 
to catalyze additional climate commitments. Local governments in Oregon are beginning 
to opt into global reporting mechanisms and this trend should continue.  
5. Promote Collaboration 
Local governments in Oregon should take advantage of opportunities to 
collaborate with one another and with local governments in other states and even 
countries. University of Oregon Professor Rich Margerum defines collaboration as “an 
approach to solving complex problems in which a diverse group of autonomous 
stakeholders deliberate to build consensus and develop networks for translating 
consensus into results.” Collaboration in public policy and planning is becoming more 
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prevalent because society has “addressed many of the more straightforward problems, 
and we are now left with the more difficult, contentious, and diffuse problems.”251  
Other scholars note that municipalities which coordinate with other levels of 
government and other municipalities are more likely to “adopt meaningful [emission 
reduction] policies.”252 Coordinated climate policy collaborations have already begun. 
For example, in Washington state, the King County-Cities Climate Collaboration is a 
nationally-recognized partnership platform that leverages limited city resources to 
achieve climate targets.253 While it is difficult to say whether it would be more effective 
for local governments in Oregon to join an existing collaborative body (such as Portland, 
Eugene, and several other Oregon cities have), or form an Oregon specific body, any 
form of collaboration could lead to better emission reduction outcomes. 
 Outside of the government to government context, local governments could also 
consider working with signatory (and other) businesses to the Oregon Climate Business 
Declaration in a number of ways. First, they could work together to host events that boost 
public awareness of climate change and potential policy solutions. Second, they could 
amplify pressure on the state and federal government to develop and implement 
significant climate policies. Third, they could apply pressure to non-signatory businesses 
to sign the declaration and commit to more sustainable business practices. 
 Engaging in collaborative efforts like these may help local governments answer 
and refine a set of questions posed by a National League of Cities’ article on initial GHG 
reduction planning steps. Note that these questions are primarily applicable to local 
governments in Oregon that have not begun formal GHG emission reduction efforts. The 
article suggests the following questions: 
 What is the city’s capacity (e.g. to calculate emissions)? What will the scope of 
planning be (e.g. municipal operations only or community-wide activities)? 
 Who are the stakeholders in the community? 
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 How will data be collected? 
 What mitigation and/or adaptation measures will be taken?254 
The next two categories of recommendations may also provide the opportunity to 
collaboratively engage local emission reduction efforts.  
6. Consider New Governance Bodies 
Recall that one of climate policymakers’ principal desires was that the State of 
Oregon amplify its leadership and coordination of local government emission reduction 
efforts. This could be accomplished by promoting new governance bodies or reforming 
existing bodies. Reformation may be a better route because it avoids expending resources 
to develop potentially redundant new governance bodies. For example, the current 
mission of the Oregon Global Warming Commission is: “to recommend ways to 
coordinate state and local efforts to reduce Oregon’s GHG emissions consistent with 
Oregon’s goals and to recommend efforts to help the state, local governments, businesses 
and residents prepare for the effects of global warming.”255 Short of regulatory authority, 
this mission statement is already very strong and targeted. However, the climate 
policymaker community in Oregon appears to be frustrated with outcomes, so it seems 
like a reformation effort should consider why the OGWC is not functioning as well as 
possible. The OGWC appears to be operating on a shoe-string budget – perhaps it is time 
that the state prioritizes the commission’s work if it is serious about meeting GHG 
emission reduction goals. 
While the Oregon Global Warming Commission and the Oregon Climate Change 
Research Institute have been established and are operating on the statewide level already, 
there is certainly room for local bodies to contribute. A 2009 report to Oregon Governor 
Kulongoski stated that new forms of governance could be implemented just as watershed 
councils were developed in the 1990s to tackle issues with planning and management of 
watersheds.256 The main climate-related takeaway from this report was that “we need to 
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modify our planning and decision-making processes so that we conduct them on a 
holistic basis that considers multiple interconnected systems – as well as mitigation and 
adaptation – simultaneously.”257 
New institutions could build off of the advisory bodies that have already formed 
at the local level; for example, the City of Gresham has a Natural Resources and 
Sustainability Committee, the City of Eugene has a Sustainability Committee, and the 
City of Portland has a Planning and Sustainability Commission, as well as an Alternative 
Technology Advisory Committee.258 However, it remains to be seen how effective these 
advisory bodies will be at providing useful information on polices that might reduce 
GHG emissions, and whether bodies with regulatory powers should be developed. 
7. Incorporate Social and Environmental Justice into Local Climate Initiatives 
In order to make new environmental initiatives resilient and successful – 
especially at the local level – social and environmental justice (EJ) concerns should 
receive greater attention. The first generation of environmental laws were often effective 
on a meta-level but also resulted in substantial costs for some communities. For example, 
in the context of Clean Air Act initiatives to reduce air pollution, some communities 
found themselves victim to “hot spots” of concentrated air pollution because they were 
not informed of changes or given the opportunity to participate in decision making 
processes that affected them.  
While it may be difficult to achieve socially and environmentally just results, 
Oregon’s local governments should undertake efforts to promote social and environment 
justice. Respondent climate policymakers overwhelmingly supported the view that low-
income and vulnerable communities should not be harmed by GHG emission reduction 
policies. This sentiment may have contributed to, or been a cause of, recent steps to 
prioritize EJ. Such efforts include Portland, Oregon’s establishment of an equity working 
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group for its climate planning processes259 and the establishment of the State of Oregon’s 
Environmental Justice Task Force (EJTF) in 2007.260 This task force defines EJ as: 
[E]qual protection from environmental and health hazards, and meaningful public 
participation in decisions that affect the environment in which people live, work, 
learn, practice spirituality, and play. EJ communities include minority and low-
income communities, tribal communities, and other communities traditionally 
underrepresented in public process. Underrepresented communities may include 
those with significant populations of youth, the elderly, or those with physical or 
mental disabilities.261 
 Although low-income and vulnerable communities have begun to receive more 
attention, they “continue to bear disproportionate risk of adverse health impacts as a 
result of government decision-making.”262 The EJTF opines that equitable outcomes are 
often not achieved because “best practices in outreach and engagement to overcome 
barriers to participation for disenfranchised communities [are not utilized].”263 It is 
important that local governments strive to utilize best practices because “Using a 
culturally competent approach to capacity-building, acknowledging privilege, and 
fostering open communication will help build trust with traditionally underrepresented 
communities, who can then help avoid potential disparate impacts….”264 
 One best practice is the use of collaborative governance, whereby government 
strives “to ensure all stakeholders – especially those from communities of color and low-
income communities who are most potentially impacted by a decision – are at the table 
with capacity to meaningfully participate.”265 The EJTF opined that “Collaborative 
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governance models can transform traditional public/private roles and partnerships by 
focusing on building trust, identifying and addressing shared problems, being flexible, 
and working toward consensus rather than compromise.”266 
 While some statewide and local bodies have already begun considering these 
issues of justice, we can and must do better, particularly in relation to policies that strive 
to reduce GHG emissions. The 2015 OGWC report cautioned that while many emission 
reduction strategies are beneficial over the long-term, policymakers should recognize 
that:  
[S]ome may either involve significant upfront costs or could result in an 
inequitable distribution of costs and benefits over the course of implementation. 
We are particularly concerned about these equity considerations with respect to 
low income Oregon households and many rural Oregon communities, which are 
likely to be more vulnerable to both the costs of measures to contain emissions, 
and to costs of our failure to contain the effects of climate change.267 
Knowing these concerns, local governments should proactively involve low-income, 
disadvantaged, and historically underrepresented communities in the emission reduction 
decision-making process. 
8. Apply Pressure to State and Federal Government 
Many of the previous recommendations will either require state and federal action 
to become realities, or such action will enhance the effectiveness of policies that local 
governments can pursue without state and federal support.268 A potential unintended 
consequence of local climate initiatives is that pressure on the state and federal 
government may diminish if advocates refocus their efforts on the local level and forget 
the importance of advocacy at the state and federal level. While successful local 
initiatives are incredibly important because they enable the achievement of state and 
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federal emission reduction targets, climate action enthusiasts should remember that 
concurrent efforts at the state, federal, and international level are also necessary. 
Pressure on state and federal government is important because statewide and 
federal support motivates a broad swath of local governments to take action. For 
example, when national governments assume leadership roles, cities fall into line: “Over 
1,000 local elected officials ultimately committed to meet or beat the Kyoto Protocol’s 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of 7% reduction below 1990 levels by 
2012.”269 States have a role to play as well. California has some of the nation’s most 
aggressive plans to reduce GHG emissions, and unsurprisingly also has the greatest 
number of cities pursuing aggressive GHG emissions reduction targets. Therefore, local 
governments in Oregon should pressure the State of Oregon and the federal government 
to maintain and expand their climate change initiatives, because doing so will make it 
easier to achieve local emission reductions. 
There are many ways that Oregon’s local governments might engage on the state 
and national stage. In a recent example, both Eugene and Portland (along with 52 other 
counties, cities, and mayors, and the National League of Cities) signed onto an amicus 
brief in support of the Environmental Protection Agency’s position in the Clean Power 
Plan litigation.270 The brief notes that local government’s “innovative, uncoordinated 
forays have wanted for the support and certainty that only a more comprehensive federal 
framework for reducing the power sector’s greenhouse gas emissions can provide.”271 
Statements like this have the potential to inform the federal government that local 
government actions are constrained by the uncertainty and lack of support from a federal 
framework. While it is impossible to know how helpful such statements truly are, the act 
of cities coming together in solidarity may by itself be useful. Relationships across the 
country are forming. These relationships will promote the sharing of best practices for 
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GHG emission reductions and will facilitate the formation of future coalitions for climate 
change policy progress. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
Despite meeting its 2010 goal of arresting and beginning to reduce emissions, the 
State of Oregon is not on track to meet the 2020 goal of reducing GHG emission levels 
10% below 1990 levels or the 2050 goal of reducing GHG emission levels at least 75% 
below 1990 levels. The 2015 OGWC report projected “Oregon’s 2020 emissions to be 11 
million [metric tons] MTCO2e above the target level set by the Legislature for that year, 
with the gap between emissions and our goals widening each year to 2050 and beyond 
unless additional action is taken to contain and drive down emissions.”272 In response to 
this projection, the OGWC noted that in order to “put Oregon on a sustainable path to 
meeting our 2050 goal, we must immediately begin taking more ambitious action than 
what we have seriously contemplated as a state historically.”273 
While it is possible (albeit unlikely) that the State of Oregon can achieve its 
emission reduction goals without additional efforts by local governments, local 
governments and citizens would be wise to heed the advice of the 2004 Oregon Strategy 
for Greenhouse Gas Reductions. In that report, the Governor’s Advisory Group on 
Global Warming concluded that “a 2050 goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions 75 
percent below 1990 levels would likely be the least demanding target we might merit. We 
will likely be called upon to deliver more significant reductions than this, rather than 
less.”274  
Indeed, the 2015 OGWC report notes that the State of Oregon’s 2007 statutory 
goals were based on the recommendations submitted to Governor Kulongoski in 2004 by 
his Advisory Group on Global Warming. The 2050 goal (75% reduction of GHGs from 
1990 levels by 2050) was based on what scientists at the time thought sustainable 
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emission levels could be.275 While this projection of sustainable emissions likely no 
longer holds true, this observation shows that our State has had the political will to set 
targets that align with climate science. Now we need to show the political will to adopt 
even more ambitious targets and to implement the policies that will achieve those targets. 
Efforts to better understand and implement local climate policy in Oregon will not 
only help the State of Oregon meet its GHG emission reduction goals, it will diminish the 
severity of the conflicts precipitated by a changing climate in Oregon. This thesis’s 
information gathering process was similar to a conflict assessment process because many 
perspectives on reducing GHG emissions in Oregon were considered through the lens of 
local governments. First, the introduction detailed core climate change and GHG 
emission reduction policy frameworks from the international to the local level. Second, 
the literature review shared legal and policy scholarship on the role of local governments 
in climate governance systems, as well as the initiatives that Oregon’s local governments 
are currently pursuing. Third, the climate policymaker survey attracted 55 responses from 
some of Oregon’s leading experts, the results of which were shared in the discussion 
section. Finally, considering the findings from each of the previous sections’ inquiries, 
eight categories of recommendations were developed to help guide future GHG emission 
reduction efforts across Oregon. 
This thesis recommended that local governments 1) revisit past studies; 2) align 
the climate agenda with other local priorities; 3) advocate for funding; 4) enhance 
information sharing and transparency; 5) promote collaboration; 6) consider new 
governance bodies; 7) incorporate social and environmental justice; and 8) apply pressure 
to the state and federal government. Based on these recommendations, many 
opportunities for further research exist. For example, the effectiveness of different 
information sharing platforms could be evaluated, the success of climate-oriented 
campaigns that also engage other pressing issues (e.g. wealth inequality) could be 
examined, or the potential legal structures of new governance bodies and EJ initiatives 
could be developed. Such efforts could even be guided and enhanced by a more robust 
survey of climate policymakers in the state.   
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Ultimately, further inquiry into local government climate initiatives should remain 
a priority because sub-national climate actions have the potential to create “‘radiator 
effects’ that may help build a foundation for successive rounds of regulatory 
initiatives….”276 This iterative cycle of local actions that encourage other governments to 
take action has already begun to play out in Oregon and will hopefully continue to do so. 
Local governments in Oregon clearly have a role to play in GHG emission reduction 
efforts because “The broad range of economic, political, and social activities that must be 
altered to sufficiently reduce greenhouse gas production will require the complementary 
and overlapping skills, competencies, and unique regulatory approaches that each level of 
government can provide.”277  
Oregon and its communities have a history of supporting innovative and 
beneficial environmental initiatives. By better focusing on local government climate 
initiatives in Oregon, we have the potential to trigger “localized ruptures” in the dominant 
climate governance frameworks. According to Professor William Sewell, “Localized 
ruptures always have the potential of bringing about a cascading series of further ruptures 
that will result in structural transformations - that is, changes in cultural schemas, shifts 
of resources, and the emergence of new modes of power.”278 Due to the threat of climate 
change and overconsumption of resources, we are entering a transformational period for 
environmental governance where the powers and expected roles of different levels of the 
state will be challenged and re-made. Local governments in Oregon are poised to be on 
the leading edge of those efforts.   
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